Source: www.rucriminal.info

The head of the TFR, Alexander Bastrykin, told Vladimir Putin that the route for the movement of a truck with cargo, which then exploded on the Crimean bridge, was established: Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, North Ossetia, Krasnodar Territory. “In addition, carriers have been identified - persons who participated in organizing its movement. With the help of FSB operatives, it was possible to identify suspects from among those who could prepare a terrorist attack, and people who operate on the territory of the Russian Federation, ”the head of the ICR said.

Rucriminal.info considers Bastrykin's report and all subsequent insinuations given to consolidate the main version of the terrorist attack on the Crimean bridge to be extremely unconvincing. Why? In the "column" of our browser.

Let's take the cargo itself, which was supposedly loaded with explosives. Packaging film is produced and sold in the Russian Federation. The first offices found in the search engine promise to easily ship 20 tons of goods a day. Moreover, manufacturers note that there is a demand for domestic film in the near abroad. The question arises: could it not seem strange to experienced customs officers and inspectors that a truck with foreign numbers is carrying goods “in the opposite” direction?

Further. Judging by the latest clarifications, the rolls of explosives that allegedly traveled half of Europe, it turns out, were left to chance after they were brought to Armavir. If not, then another link is missing - the receiving party. No one would have accepted the cargo by “whatsapp” or through a driver in a car with foreign numbers. And if he accepted, he would certainly have been detained. Understanding all the logistics (taking into account the costs of transportation and customs clearance, the film had to be at least "gold"), not a single businessman would allow himself to be used "in the dark". In the meantime, it turns out that the TEK-34 company accepted and shipped the mined film, but the owner of the company is free and is giving interviews.

There is no doubt that Mahir Yusubov signed up for his latest order through the ATI carrier exchange. It happened on October 6, in the first half of the day, almost immediately, as the ad was posted from an IP address in Moscow on behalf of the owner of the TEK-34 company. And the cargo crossed the border, as reported, on October 4th. For at least two days (loading on the Mahir truck was carried out on October 7), a ton of explosives was in Armavir. From whom and on what grounds - this was not mentioned in the report.

 

As it was not mentioned in the report, how the overloaded truck passed without inspection to a critical civilian infrastructure facility.

The Telegram channel of the Cheka-OGPU reports that an order for the delivery of cargo from Armavia to Crimea was placed via the Internet from Moscow. There were suspicions that a VPN was used, but now it is known for sure that an announcement about the need to deliver the cargo was posted from Moscow (near Sofiyskaya embankment). If we take the version of the TFR, it turns out that a truck with a ton of explosives drives around Europe and the CIS and the FSB quietly lets it into the Russian Federation, then this cargo is sent to the strategic and most guarded bridge, where it takes off into the air. At the same time, the "dispatcher" steers the explosive cargo, being 5 km from the Kremlin. All this is, to put it mildly, strange. More like a hastily made version that needed to be urgently adjusted to an already prepared charge.

Alexey Ermakov

Source: www.rucriminal.info