New developments are emerging in the case of the Lebedinsky GOK miners, minority shareholders defrauded by the beneficiaries of the Metalloinvest holding company.

According to the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info, a lawsuit seeking to invalidate the forced buyout of minority stakes in Lebedinsky GOK and OEMK will soon be filed.

This story covers the period when Alisher Usmanov entered the Gazprom elite, becoming close to Rem Vyakhirev, Vyacheslav Sheremet, Dmitry Medvedev, and the London-based Iranian-born businessman Masoud Alikhani, former director of Swan Overseas Plc (UK, No. 2411169). Middlesex Group Plc documents confirm that as early as 1993, Usmanov was listed as "an advisor to Mr. Alikhani in Moscow" and a "Central Asia expert."

Masoud Alikhani was a key participant in the USSR's unofficial arms sales to Iran.

 

Background: Ivan Safronov Sr., a military observer for Kommersant, died on March 2, 2007, after falling from a window at 2 Bronnaya Street in Moscow. The official version is suicide or an accident. However, colleagues believe Safronov's death may have been related to his professional activities: shortly before his death, he was preparing a report on Russian arms deliveries to Syria and Iran, mentioning several high-profile names in the context of arms exports.

 

The document, prepared for the High Court in London, contains 123 documented facts. The investigation's main conclusion is sensational: the first to use Gazprom's gas blackmail for personal gain was Alisher Usmanov and his team of managers from Middlesex Group Plc, Interfin, GazpromInvestHolding, and Gazmetall (now Metalloinvest).

 

The investigation details the scheme by which Usmanov transferred metallurgical assets in the Belgorod Region through the "restructuring" of LGOK and OEMK's debts to RAO Gazprom.

Alexei Navalny's conclusions, presented in the films "He's Not Dimon to You" and "Response to Alisher Usmanov," are completely consistent with the facts of the investigation: it is a large-scale scam to seize control of the largest mining and metallurgical enterprise in Eurasia—Lebedinsky GOK and OEMK.

 

Experts note that it would have been impossible to carry out such a large-scale corporate raid without the Kremlin's involvement and the personal approval of Dmitry Medvedev. Former industry officials claim that Usmanov's success inspired Putin and Patrushev to transform gas blackmail from a tool for redistributing property into a political weapon to pressure Europe. Hence Putin's famous phrase: "Are the Germans going to use firewood for fuel?"

 

To maintain their status as the most generous philanthropists, Usmanov and Moshiri created a network of offshore companies through which tens of billions of dollars in Metalloinvest's export revenue were funneled.

EU documents show that the holding's affiliated intermediary companies paid no taxes in Russia or Western jurisdictions.

Farhad Moshiri, a longtime partner of Usmanov and Alikhani, personally oversaw the multi-stage money laundering scheme.

He declared 5-7% of the revenue as pre-tax profits from offshore companies, while the bulk of the funds ended up in the family trusts of Usmanov and Moshiri.

 

Minority shareholders of Lebedinsky GOK and OEMK were deprived of their legal right to participate in the companies' profits.

When the miners realized that their shares had been forcibly purchased at a reduced price, they appealed to Usmanov to reconsider the price.

The response was promises and manipulation by Metalloinvest's lawyers.

The same managers who had previously convinced OEMK management of the "expediency" of transferring assets to Usmanov and Moshiri made similar assurances to workers in 2007–2011.

 

In their complaints to the Prosecutor General's Office, the Investigative Committee of Russia, the Federal Tax Service, and the Federal Securities Commission, the miners presented evidence of fraud.

In his lawsuit, minority shareholder Vladimir Diky alleged the concealment of $500 million in Lebedinsky GOK revenue through Moshiri's Irish offshore company.

According to documents from BGMT Ltd. (Dublin), the actual amount was over $3 billion. Russian courts and regulatory authorities ignored the appeals: deadlines had expired, and "no violations" were found.

More details on the mechanism of the property seizure, the connections between Usmanov and Moshiri, and the role of Masud Alikhan are available in a lawyer's investigation, which the editors of VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info are publishing in parts.