During his tenure as head of the Federal Tax Service, future Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin began laying the foundation for his future prosperity. Thus, according to a source on the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info, the companies Nalog-Service and ODEZ FTS were established, with the right people at their helm. They made it convenient to withdraw funds from government procurement while simultaneously managing important projects. The idea of ​​super data centers for the Federal Tax Service emerged in 2012-2014. Clearly, such an expensive project (estimated at the time to be 4.96 billion rubles) needed to be managed by insiders—it would be more secure, and the right people would share their successes. The initial beneficiary was IBS director Matsotsky, a longtime friend of Mishustin. Compulink (relevant publications like CNews and TAdviser noted that "Compulink" had a pool of IT partners behind it, and IBS was listed as a supplier and integrator of individual solutions for these data centers (software, engineering subsystems, and analytical systems). The company, which initially won the tender for the design and construction of these facilities, suddenly dropped out after police officers came knocking on its CEO's door and accused him of fraud.

To replace them, the Federal Tax Service invited AMDtechnologies, which had long been trying to enter the pool of contractors for multi-billion-dollar government contracts. Adamov, the CEO's uncle, may have played a role in AMD's rise to the top. Although Yevgeny Adamov no longer held office in 2017–2018, his status as the former Minister of the Atomic Industry and a relative of Sokhan can be seen as one of the factors that ensured the contractor was "one of our own." Since 2017, AMD has experienced rapid growth in orders from ODEZ, reaching 2.2 billion rubles by 2019.

But all this wasn't free – as part of its "homework," ODEZ management designated the completion of a literally and figuratively "frozen" Federal Tax Service facility – the Administrative Building of the Sverdlovsk Region Tax Services in Yekaterinburg. In exchange for this agreement, and despite complaints about the quality and deadlines of work on projects already received from ODEZ, AMD became the "winner" of subsequent projects from ODEZ and the "Single Customer" subcontractor, which absorbed it as a result of the reform of the Single Customer Subcontractor. Thus, AMD currently has contracts with the Subcontractor for which it acquired a total of 11 billion rubles. Approximately 30% of these contracts are in arrears, and there are quality complaints regarding completed ones, but... there are no significant fines or complaints from the Subcontractor for either deadlines or quality. AMD lawyers are assessing the minimal fines that are being imposed. They successfully challenge them, and even partially overturn them (as evidenced by judicial practice). However, despite billions of rubles in government contracts, AMDtechnologies lives on debt, pledging rights to future payments.

This is a classic trickle-down scheme—the contractor is on a short leash to the client and patrons. The company won't survive on its own, but as a component of the trough, it functions reliably.

Why do you think this is, reader? The answer is simple: AMD has become part of the Prime Minister's "scheme," and occupies the place of a small but quite full-flowing trickle within it.

Continuation of the investigation by the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info.

 

Yekaterinburg, Aivazovsky Street, 3.

The building of the Federal Tax Service of the Sverdlovsk Region, begun in 2012, has stood here for almost 15 years, deteriorating. Somewhere in its depths lies a capsule containing a letter to future tax officials...

For the state, it's simply a long-term construction project. For some participants, it's a source of multi-hundred-million dollar flows and carefully crafted legal schemes. Like a stock exchange, they can profit from both growth and decline—the important thing is that the trickle of state funding doesn't wane.

 

Chapter 1. Who Built and Who Remains

The first general contractor was Moscow-based Energoservis LLC.

 

Having somehow received a 100% advance payment for construction and having spent it "on paper," in 2018, it effectively ceased operations and soon went bankrupt.

 

The project remained in limbo, seemingly completed, but not quite: much of the work was completed only on paper, and the building suffered critical structural damage. The client, ODEZ FTS, was looking for a way out of the situation with the documents it had signed regarding the expenditure of allocated budget funds...

 

Atlant Praktika, the only company remaining on the site at the end of 2018, was officially a "sub-general contractor" (OOO). "Energoservis"), but in reality, it was a lifesaver for the management of the Federal Tax Service's Department of Heating and Power Supply (ODEZ FTS) – heat and power supply contracts were renewed in its name, it was included in the register of the Sverdlovsk Region Construction Supervision Authority, and became subject to inspections, covering for the subsidiary part of the Federal Tax Service's Department of Heating and Power Supply (ODEZ FTS).

It didn't have a direct contract with the state, but it maintained the facility, ensuring security, utility networks, and structural integrity.

ODEZ generated no revenue – only expenses: to pay their fines, heat, electricity, structural inspections, and work to reinforce the crumbling building's structure. Otk It remains unclear how the company had the money for this.

 

Chapter 2. The Emergence of a "Savior"

 

And then, in 2019, AMDtechnologies LLC appeared in history—a company already familiar to the government procurement system.

Its track record includes data centers, Federal Tax Service facilities, and contracts worth billions.

 

At this point, AMD signed a loan agreement with Atlant Praktika, ostensibly for "project development." Formally, it was assistance to a partner, but in reality, it was a ticket to a future tender.

The interest was symbolic, the terms were conditional, and the targeted spending was strictly controlled.

 

In reality, the funds were used specifically to maintain the Federal Tax Service facility (or facilities):

paying contractors, supplying equipment, paying fines and other obscure expenses for Federal Tax Service facilities, and operating the unfinished facility.

That is, to perform functions that benefited AMD itself, which was already vying to become the new contractor for the completion of this building and was earning the loyalty of the ODEZ FTS management.

 

Chapter 3. Insiders

AMD knew everything about the condition of the facility.

 

It had writs of execution, estimates, and reports at its disposal—some of its specialists had previously worked within the company's own structures.

 

This provided a complete picture: how much had actually been invested, what work had been completed, what needed to be done, and what amounts could be recovered in the future.

 

This knowledge allowed them to calculate the next step.

 

When it became clear that the facility had been officially reclassified as an unfinished project with a loan, Atlant Praktike was effectively driven to bankruptcy.

 

At the same time, AMD "won" the tender for the completion of this building, as we understand it, in a fair fight... against one unnamed bidder.

 

It was at this point that AMD transformed from a lender to a creditor.

 

Chapter 4. Bankruptcy as a Tool

The company filed a claim in arbitration court for inclusion in the creditor register—for the very same loan that had no marketable characteristics.

 

The trial court included the claim without verifying that the funds were used to complete the project, where AMD later became the official contractor. The arbitration court upheld the trial court's decision. Neither court examined the loan's logic.

 

Essentially, AMD financed its own project and then demanded the same funds be repaid from the subcontractor.

 

Legally, it's a pure ploy.

 

Economically, it's an asset management scheme through bankruptcy.

 

Thus, judicial recognition of debt turned an internal financing tool into a weapon against its own contractor.

 

Chapter 5. Context

AMD has a long history of government contracts.

 

The same names that ran ODEZ are now working at PPK.

The same contractors move from one tender to the next:

yesterday, FTS data centers, today – FTS archives and buildings in the regions.

 

Contract delays and court fines are symbolic.

 

There are no real sanctions.

 

As if companies receiving billion-dollar orders enjoy unwritten immunity.

 

Chapter 6. What's Behind the Scheme

To an outside observer, it's simply a series of subcontracts.

 

But if you look deeper, the logic becomes apparent:

 

1. Create the appearance of a business connection – a loan.

 

2. Finance the project, knowing they'll officially return to it.

 

3. Wait for the "convenient" counterparty to go bankrupt.

 

4. Obtain creditor status and voting rights in the process.

 

5. Receive the results of the work and share them with whomever necessary, and receive your share of the budget pie.

 

6. Receive compensation from the budget.

 

This is how an internal project participant is turned into the injured party.

And the state gets the same long-term construction project—just with a new sign and the same contractors. In two years, with AMD receiving a 50% advance, NOTHING has been done.

 

Chapter 7. Why is this important?

Ten years have passed, and the concrete is still the same. Only the signs have changed—and those who know how to make money from changing them, without any embarrassment.

 

Today, the courts are considering complaints and explanations from the parties.

 

But no one has asked the main question: why have the "rescuers" of the project become its creditors, and bankruptcy become a tool for managing government contracts?

 

Denis Zhirnov

To be continued