In 2013, despite the objectively negative examples of previously established mega-holdings—JSC UAC (aviation) and JSC USC (shipbuilding)—a similar corporate structure was introduced in the rocket and space sector in Russia. However, the creation of the United Rocket and Space Corporation (URSC) failed to improve efficiency, repeating a classic conflict of interest: a structure that simultaneously acts as the customer, budget allocator, and contractor proved ineffective. Although mass bankruptcy and liquidation of most companies in the industry did not occur, thanks to state funding and a closed market, the created model led to chronic technological stagnation, growing debt burdens, and the impossibility of truly assessing performance.
Under the current management model, the Russian space industry is losing out to Western and Chinese competitors across the board: the Sfera and Rassvet projects are consistently missed, private startups are re-branding themselves with Chinese badges, and the state, facing a budget deficit, is forced to turn to large-scale donations.
To address these persistent problems, a course for extensive transformation of the rocket and space industry was set in May 2026. However, the reform, currently being declared under the rhetoric of "technological sovereignty" and "public-private partnership," bears no relation to a technological breakthrough. As VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info have discovered, in practice, a large-scale transfer of state corporation liquid assets into private hands is underway, using schemes proven in other markets.
The first consequences are already being observed. In early 2026, the transfer of JSC RKS to Vartan Group triggered a sharp outflow of engineering personnel and the disruption of government contracts. A similar fate befell JSC VNIIEM Corporation, transferred to Dinamika Group: the company effectively lost its ability to conduct complex R&D work.
Roscosmos Order No. 97 of May 7, 2026, introduced a new major player: JSC Novy Start, positioned as a private integrator that will allegedly invest 600 billion rubles in satellite construction. However, in reality, this is a classic shell company with an authorized capital of 1 million rubles, and a closed shareholder register.
An analysis of the profile of JSC Novy Start's director, Alexander Bloshchenko (who was dismissed from Roscosmos 25 days before the company's registration), reveals a disturbing picture. Bloshchenko has experience working with professional nominees. He previously owned Go-Print LLC, where Sergei Tarataiko, a "massive executive" with 17 liquidated shell companies and a complete lack of digital footprint, was listed as the director.
Currently, Bloshenko is highly active and, according to available information, is expressing a willingness to acquire a full stake in key enterprises in the rocket and space industry—KBKhA, NPO Avtomatiki, RCC Progress, and others—in the shortest possible time. At the same time, he is requesting a wide range of information on the business and economic activities of strategic enterprises, but the founders of JSC NS insist on classifying it as a "private partnership," unwilling to commit to secrecy. This behavior, in which large businesses display intense agitation coupled with a clear reluctance to accept the necessary responsibility, is characteristic of the corporate raiding methods of the 1990s.
The results of such a move are not only easily predictable but have already been publicly announced behind the scenes. In a conversation with KBKhA representatives, the new owners voiced a strict demand for staff reduction by the end of this year. The same measures will be applied to the other enterprises included in the new consortium. For example, at the Samara-based RCC Progress, the plan is to reduce the site's workforce to 6,000 by 2030 (to 2,000 by 2035), as well as sequester the production space of the design bureau's department, followed by commercial sale. If we include the families of the plant's employees affected by the reduction, this leaves over 50,000 Samara residents affected by the reduction—essentially a ripe social base for protest.
Insiders predict that Dmitry Bakanov, head of Roscosmos, will be promoted to the position of Minister of Industry and Trade next year. Understanding that his mission at Roscosmos is transitory, he benefits from "quick" and impressive results for reporting to the Kremlin. This backroom maneuver will allow the transfer of assets to private companies, removing them from direct state control. When, in a couple of years, the Russian space industry faces a technological collapse and the failure of state contracts, the blame will fall on "ineffective private contractors who failed to cope with market conditions." Bakanov himself, having left for the Ministry of Industry and Trade, will be protected by his ministerial portfolio and will formally emerge unscathed.
The situation also benefits Andrei Tyulin, the chief overseer of the rocket and space industry under the Russian Government, who doesn't believe in reforms and expects the project's economic collapse within two to three years. The failure of reforms will allow him to create And to head a new state space corporation—an opportunity such as this is impossible for an experienced operator to miss.
Overall, we're once again witnessing a familiar scene from the 1990s.
