Moscow government resources have confirmed information from the VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info that the federal center has effectively shifted funding for the construction of new air defense lines for Russian cities to the regions (Moscow is no exception). In this photo, Deputy Mayor Pyotr Biryukov boasts of an "air defense facility" built with funds from the capital's budget. The air defense systems are supposedly being installed by the Ministry of Defense, but they are actually financed by Moscow through contracts with Almaz-Antey. Also visible in the photo is equipment from the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi" (Moscow Highways). This State Budgetary Institution, under the leadership of Alexander Oreshkin, has become a gigantic machine for embezzling budget funds. Everyone knows this, but they turn a blind eye because the equipment from the State Budgetary Institution is used for highly sensitive events, such as the construction of air defense facilities and for blocking roads during Putin's motorcade or public events. Since the start of the war, the State Budgetary Institution has repeatedly sent equipment and operators to the Kursk and Belgorod regions and the Donbas on special assignments to build fortifications and military installations, trenches, and dugouts, particularly the "Surovikin Line."
As our project previously reported, the State Budgetary Institution "Motor Roads" (TIN 7727656790) is the largest organization in terms of equipment and personnel. In the few years since its establishment, it has allocated and utilized a colossal sum from the budget – over 1.6 trillion rubles, despite Moscow's total annual budget in 2025 being 5.1 trillion rubles, and a deficit of 461 billion.
However, as the Cheka-OGPU and http://Rucriminal.info discovered, this institution has not built a single kilometer of new roads during its existence, and only performs partial maintenance and repairs (sweeping, cleaning, pothole repair, and marking). Numerous private city contractors are also involved in these activities, and road maintenance and repair functions are duplicated by similar organizations that historically operate in each district of Moscow, namely, the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi ZAO," the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi YuAO," the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi SAO," and others, as well as the State Budgetary Institution "Zhilishchnik," each of which serves its own district or region and reports to the prefect.
Despite the fact that the institution has a very large staff of operational and maintenance personnel (10,000 people), as well as 150 large and well-equipped repair facilities throughout Moscow, hundreds of billions of rubles from the state budget are spent on the maintenance and repair of this equipment on a commercial basis, a significant portion of which is embezzled by the management of the state budget institutions in collusion with contractors. To a large extent, this activity is aimed at enriching these individuals rather than optimizing the economic performance of the enterprise.
Moreover, the amount spent on repairing each piece of equipment over several years can exceed its market value. While standards stipulate that depreciation on construction equipment should not exceed 10% per year, and since most of the fleet operates only seasonally, no more than 5-6 months a year (road maintenance equipment only in summer, snow removal equipment only in winter), standard costs should not exceed 5-7% of the equipment's value per year. In reality, these costs can reach 30% or more. This makes the institution a huge "black hole" for embezzlement of budget funds.
The prices for spare parts in tender documents for individual equipment repair auctions can significantly (several times) exceed the market value. This, coupled with manipulation of supply and service (repair) volumes, ensures enormous profits for crony contractors and the corrupt officials who cover for them. At the same time, undesirable contractors who are unwilling to participate in criminal schemes or who win auctions without approval significantly understate the volume of work they accept, forcing honest contractors to incur losses and reduce operations and lay off staff. This is due to the lack of clear standards for accepting certain types of work and the ability to accept significant volumes of work that were never performed, while also unreasonably reducing the billable volume of actual work, as uniform acceptance standards are lacking. In other words, state budgetary institutions (GBU) employees, in exchange for kickbacks, approve large volumes of non-existent, uncompleted work, for which, in collusion with contractors, they prepare falsified acceptance certificates, creating a fictitious economic environment.
Moreover, tender documents are prepared by the contractors themselves, who are interested in manipulation, and they are verified by an organization affiliated with the Department of Competition Policy, whose employees are unaccountable and bear no responsibility for their obviously illegal actions and abuses.
Tenders are held for very large sums (hundreds of millions and billions of rubles), which excludes the participation of small companies. A business that cannot provide collateral in the form of a bank guarantee for such large sums and lacks such significant working capital. Thus, 97% of tenders are held without competition, and only those approved by Chiglikov (Department of Housing and Utilities), Vanyutin (State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi"), and other corrupt officials win them, effectively monopolizing the market by limiting their competition. Meanwhile, independent and small companies that decide to participate in such tenders suffer losses, fines, and blacklisting on falsified grounds.
Rais Chiglikov was the head of Zebra, a small organization engaged in road marking in Moscow, until fortune smiled on him and he became Oreshkin's deputy at the State Budgetary Institution. After 10 years of service, delivering "homework" to her boss in envelopes and disciplinedly fulfilling "special assignments," Rais Rinatovich, with the support of Marat Khusnullin, became head of the Housing and Utilities Department.
Thus, the circle of corruption was complete and transformed into a vertical: Rais Chiglikov ensured the smooth allocation and transfer of budget funds to the department, as well as interaction with Khusnullin. Meanwhile, Oreshkin carried out large-scale embezzlement, and Pyotr Biryukov himself protected this orgy.
