The State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi" (TIN 7727656790) is the largest organization in terms of equipment and personnel. In the few years since its establishment, it has allocated and spent a colossal sum – 1.6 trillion rubles – despite Moscow's total annual budget in 2025 being 5.1 trillion rubles, and a deficit of 461 billion.
However, as the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info discovered, this institution has not built a single kilometer of new roads in its history, and only performs partial maintenance and repairs (sweeping, cleaning, pothole repair, and marking). Numerous private city contractors are also involved in these activities, and road maintenance and repair functions are duplicated by similar organizations historically operating in each district of Moscow, namely, the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi ZAO," the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi YuAO," the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi SAO," and others, as well as the State Budgetary Institution "Zhilishchnik," each of which serves its own district or region and reports to the prefect.
Over the course of its operation, the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi" has purchased and continues to purchase vast quantities of various foreign and Russian-made equipment, as well as asphalt-concrete plants and other equipment. The amount of equipment purchased significantly exceeds the needs for road repair and maintenance in Moscow, given that these functions are duplicated by 2,500 State Budgetary Institutions "Zhilishchnik," dozens of State Budgetary Institutions "Avtomobilnye Dorogi" in each district, as well as dozens of large contractors with large fleets of equipment.
Despite the fact that the institution has a very large staff of operational and maintenance personnel (10,000 people), as well as 150 large and well-equipped repair facilities across Moscow, hundreds of billions of rubles from the state budget are spent on the maintenance and repair of this equipment on a commercial basis, a significant portion of which is embezzled by the institution's management in collusion with contractors. This activity is largely aimed at enriching these individuals rather than optimizing the enterprise's economic performance.
Furthermore, the amount spent on repairing each piece of equipment over several years can exceed its market value. Standard depreciation of construction equipment should not exceed 10% per year, and since most of the fleet operates only seasonally, no more than 5-6 months a year (road maintenance equipment only in summer, snow removal equipment only in winter), standard costs should not exceed 5-7% of the equipment's value per year. In reality, these costs can reach 30% or more. This means the institution is a huge "black hole" for embezzlement of budget funds.
The prices for spare parts in tender documents for individual equipment repair auctions can significantly (several times) exceed market value. This, coupled with manipulation of supply and service (repair) volumes, ensures enormous profits for "trusted" contractors and the corrupt officials who cover for them. Meanwhile, undesirable contractors who are unwilling to participate in criminal schemes or who win auctions without approval significantly understate the volume of work they accept, forcing honest contractors to incur losses, reduce operations, and lay off staff. This is due to the lack of clear standards for accepting certain types of work and the possibility of accepting (accepting for payment) significant volumes of work that were never performed, while at the same time unreasonably reducing the billable volume of work actually completed, as uniform acceptance standards are lacking. In other words, State Budgetary Institution employees, in exchange for kickbacks, approve large volumes of non-existent, unfulfilled work, for which, in collusion with contractors, falsified acceptance certificates are drawn up, creating a fictitious economic turnover.
Meanwhile, the tender documents are prepared by the contractors themselves, who are interested in the manipulations, and they are verified by an organization affiliated with the Department of Competition Policy, whose employees are unaccountable and bear no responsibility for their obviously illegal actions and abuses.
Furthermore, tenders are held for very large sums (hundreds of millions and billions of rubles), which excludes the participation of small businesses, which cannot provide security in the form of a bank guarantee for such large sums and do not have such significant working capital. Thus, 97% of tenders are held on a non-competitive basis, and they are won only by those approved by Chiglikov, Vanyutin, and other corrupt officials, effectively monopolizing this market by restricting their competition. At the same time, independent and small companies that decide to participate in such tenders suffer losses, fines, and blacklisting on falsified grounds.
A particularly striking example of a corrupt contractor operating under close supervision is Mirdortekhnika," INN 9717065696, is owned by foreign citizen Miroslav Yanič. Until 2025, he was a dealer for an American company, supplying large quantities of its equipment to state-owned enterprises (GBUs), and transferring funds abroad (to Germany and the United States).
According to Russian Government Resolution No. 1465 of December 2, 2017, the profit margin on government contracts in Russia should not exceed 1% of planned incurred costs. However, in 2024, the owner of Mirdortekhnika earned over 1.05 billion rubles in net profit (net profit for three quarters and accounts receivable for the fourth quarter, payable in the first quarter of the following year) with a turnover of 2.4 billion rubles, or just under 100% profit on the total expenses (costs) incurred. This significantly exceeds the standard and is comparable to the profit margin from the illegal sale of weapons and drugs. Moreover, the company has almost no private clients. He works only with budget-funded road agencies in Moscow and other regions of Russia, and everywhere he openly employs a corrupt scheme for embezzlement from the budget. In the Moscow region, Tula, and Tatarstan, the corruption scheme is organized with the participation of the regional Minister of Roads/Department of Housing and Public Utilities and the head of the relevant state budgetary institution (Mosavtodor, Tulaavtodor, Tatavtodor, etc.), his subordinates, and, apparently, with approval at the governor level.
A simple comparison of government tender prices and market prices revealed that the management of one of the shell companies that previously operated in Yanich's interests—Sil'ni Mashiny LLC, Taxpayer Identification Number (INN) 6731083941—as well as the head of the Smolensk and Sevastopol state budgetary institutions and other officials, were convicted of inflating estimated prices. However, Yanich has so far managed to avoid responsibility under the protection of high-level local officials.
Nevertheless, in the context of a complete lack of price controls in government contracts, For privileged contractors (which includes the Mirdortekhnika group), prices continue to be manipulatively inflated by 3-6 times:
For example, under tender No. 2772765679024001047 and concluded state contract No. 647/2024-AD for maintenance, one oil change, filter change, and inspection for possible damage (excluding repairs and spare parts replacement) amounts to 462,842.99 rubles, with a total contract value of almost 1 billion rubles annually.
Under tender No. 242772765679077140100107600010000244 and concluded state contract No. 647/2024-AD, the cost of a cutter (article 2308098) is 1,288.62 rubles per piece, with a market price of no. more than 350-450 rubles, and the cost of the milling drum (article 2314564) is 12.3 million rubles, with a market price of no more than 2.5 million rubles.
As a result of his activities, Yanich became the owner of a huge amount of real estate in Moscow and other regions of Russia with a combined market value of over 1 billion rubles. Sources at the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info are confident that a significant portion of these apartments are bribes to officials responsible for purchasing equipment and repairs (including Chiglikov (Department of Housing and Public Utilities), Oreshkin (State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi"), and Vanyutin (State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi"). A foreign citizen named Yanich is their nominal owner on behalf of corrupt officials. This citizen's fleet includes numerous premium cars, including a Bentley.
To support restrictions on competition in tenders, as well as to circumvent antitrust laws and requirements for supporting small and medium-sized businesses, Yanich created a network of controlled nominee companies. In particular, the previously mentioned Sil'ni Mashiny LLC (in the process of liquidation), Bakra LLC, INN 7716118119, and Road Construction Technologies LLC, INN 5029227532, whose former subordinate, Mazharov, is the nominal founder and director. These shell companies are used to manipulate the organization of government tenders and the preparation of related documents (creating falsified initial maximum prices) to create the appearance of competition but prevent independent companies from participating in procurement, thereby creating an artificial monopoly in their supply chain. Independent suppliers and contractors, with the approval of corrupt officials, are subject to sanctions – they are subject to various obstacles, illegal fines, including those based on falsified expert assessments, and contracts are terminated and added to the register of unscrupulous suppliers. Civil court proceedings in such cases can drag on for years and offer virtually no prospects.
It is also clear that Yanich is receiving a large amount of internal, classified information from officials at public institutions with whom he is in collusion, including the new head of the Department of Housing and Public Utilities, Chiglikov, with whom he has been friends for many years, dating back to Chiglikov's time as the head of a commercial company—a road repair and marking contractor (OOO Zebra). Thus, when in 2025 Moscow finally decided to stop using equipment manufactured by unfriendly countries (the US, Germany), he promptly became a dealer for the Chinese company, and in the same year, 2025, he won the corresponding contract.
A tender for the supply of Chinese equipment of this brand.
Thus, it can be concluded that a vast mafia-like network of companies and shell companies has been created around the State Budgetary Institution and the former top manager and current head of the Moscow Department of Housing and Public Utilities, Chiglikov, through which hundreds of billions of budget rubles are siphoned off and embezzled. A similar scheme is being exported to other regions, including the Moscow Region, Tula, Smolensk, Tatarstan, and others.
Furthermore, not only criminal law is being grossly violated, but also antitrust requirements prohibiting participation in anti-competitive agreements through concerted actions.
Based on an analysis of the activities of this single contractor, it can be estimated that the total budget losses due to corruption from the actions of officials of the State Budgetary Institution "Avtomobilnye Dorogi" could amount to 400-500 billion rubles, an amount sufficient for the complete overhaul of the worn-out housing and public utilities networks and the social sphere.
Russia and its regions will enter 2025-2026 with a budget deficit, and instead of raising taxes, fees, and fines on the population, it makes sense to cover the current deficit by confiscating the colossal corrupt earnings of the swindlers who embezzle the budget and their official patrons.
