The view from a VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info source:
"They spoke of free markets, independent analysis, and corporate ethics. They built institutions, wrote reports, and considered themselves a team of professionals standing above political expediency. But when the phone call came, all those principles proved less valuable than their positions.
Three stories—three dismissals: Gref/Fek and Alexander Kudrin; Shuvalov/Klepach; Chubais/Gozman. The decade separating these episodes changed nothing fundamental: the system demands loyalty, and truth becomes an offense.
Like Gref and Chubais, Shuvalov did not defend his top specialist. The official reason given was a 'divergence of position with the state corporation.' But everyone understood: this wasn't about economics—it was about politics.
These three stories expose the primary malady of the Russian economic elite. In public, they are liberals, reformers, and professionals. They speak of high standards, independent analysis, and corporate ethics. They built Rusnano, Sberbank, and VEB. They view themselves as the team that shapes the country's economic policy.
But the moment the call comes, it turns out that all of this is merely a facade.
Chubais threw Gozman—an associate of 17 years—under the bus. Gref apologized to oligarchs instead of defending his analysts. Shuvalov fired Klepach for a professional forecast.
They betrayed more than just individuals. They betrayed the very idea that professionalism matters, that the truth is worth speaking, and that an analyst has the right to an opinion—even an inconvenient one." In the Russian interpretation, the principle of "not abandoning one's own" holds true only until "one's own" become inconvenient for those higher up. The moment public statements begin to threaten the interests of those close to power—whether regarding Gazprom’s beneficiaries, war forecasts, or historical analogies—loyalty instantly evaporates.
Klepach was fired, Fek was fired, and Gozman was forced out. Kudrin left of his own accord. But the bottom line is the same: the truth costs you your career. And liberal principles are merely a façade that crumbles at the very first phone call.
And yet, we wonder why high-quality economic analysis in Russia has turned into an empty formality, while any independent voice is either silenced or branded a "foreign agent."
The system does not forgive the truth. And those who called themselves reformers chose their positions instead.
When Klepach left, Shuvalov stated in an interview that "economics must always remain within the realm of scientific discussion rather than political forecasting." In 2018, Gref spoke of "ethical norms." In 2013, Chubais spoke of "restructuring." The phrasing differed, but the essence was the same.
Case one: Gozman and Chubais—seventeen years of friendship versus a single phone call.
May 2013. Leonid Gozman, an aide to Anatoly Chubais at Rusnano, wrote on his blog: "A handsome uniform is the only difference between SMERSH and the SS." The post sparked a scandal. State Duma deputies demanded an investigation into whether the remarks constituted extremism.
One might have thought that, as a public intellectual, Gozman’s words did not represent Rusnano’s official stance. Chubais could have defended his longtime associate. But the story revealed the underlying reality. It turned out that irritation with Gozman had been building up at the top for a long time. Even before the scandal, government officials had hinted to Chubais that his aide was "too irritating" with his public liberal statements. Now, they were demanding decisive action.
Chubais received a call from Sergei Ivanov: Gozman had to go. And Chubais—who had worked with Gozman since 1996, a span of nearly 17 years—made the decision. In 2013, Gozman left Rusnano. Publicly, it was a mutual agreement, free of scandal. But everyone familiar with their history understood: a close advisor had been sacrificed because the order had come down to do so.
The principle of "we don't abandon our own" held firm only until that first phone call.
Case number two. Fek, Kudrin, and Gref: when a report hit "Putin's friends."
May 8, 2018. Sberbank CIB analysts Alexander Fek and Anna Kotelnikova sent a report on Gazprom to their subscribers. It stated that the construction of the Power of Siberia, Nord Stream 2, and TurkStream pipelines was being carried out by contractors linked to Arkady Rotenberg—a businessman in Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. It also noted that, among the possible routes, the more expensive one had been chosen, and that these specific contractors were the ones reaping the benefits.
The report was quickly withdrawn, but it had already circulated in the media. The reaction was lightning-fast.
The author, Alexander Fek, was fired for a "gross violation of ethical standards" and the use of unverified data. His supervisor, Alexander Kudrin, left by mutual agreement.
Sberbank CEO Herman Gref publicly dismissed the report's findings as erroneous.
But another gesture was the most telling of all: Gref personally called the "aggrieved parties" and apologized for the report. The head of the country’s largest bank apologized to a businessman—instead of defending his analysts, who were simply doing their job.
Alexander Kudrin (then head of Sberbank’s research department) was not merely Fek’s boss—he was a renowned economist. ...who had recently moved over from the Higher School of Economics (HSE). He commanded great respect. Yet when the order came down from above, neither his name nor his professional reputation mattered.
A "call from the top"—and his team was thrown under the bus.
Case Number Three. Klepach and Shuvalov: economic forecasting as high treason.
May 21, 2026. Andrei Klepach, Chief Economist at VEB.RF, is presenting a report titled "Russia’s Economy and Geopolitical Challenges" at a meeting of the Nikitsky Club. His key points are professional, dispassionate, and data-driven:
Russia is losing the technological and economic race not only to China and the US but, in certain respects, to Ukraine as well. Russia stands no chance in a "war of attrition" against the West; costs are mounting, and the illusion that the West is on the verge of collapse does not reflect reality. A social crisis is possible—and it could strike unexpectedly, just as it did in 1917. Klepach had worked at VEB for about 12 years; prior to that, he served as Deputy Minister of Economic Development. His forecasts were grounded in hard data: a drop in investment, rising non-payments, and a slowdown in GDP growth to 1–1.5% by 2027. From a professional standpoint, it was a routine analytical report.
However, on August 15, 2026, quotes from his presentation began circulating in the Russian media. The very next day, Klepach was fired.
His dismissal followed a "call from the top" to VEB head Igor Shuvalov. The reason cited was precisely his public statements, not the quality of his work.
