VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info continue to report on the corruption schemes of PJSC MOEK, orchestrated by a Rotenberg clan henchman, MOEK Deputy General Director Zaurbek Dzhambulatov. Former employees of the Economic Security Department of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dzhambulatov is one of them), previously dismissed from law enforcement due to high-profile corruption scandals, used connections in the FSB, as well as connections between Andrei Khorev and Viktor Shendrik and Arkady Romanovich Rotenberg, to occupy leadership positions at dozens of state-owned enterprises and organize thefts.
Former security officials were appointed to key positions under the patronage of Arkady Rotenberg, the now disgraced Kirill Seleznev (RusKhimAlyans LLC). They were tasked with overseeing and distributing financial flows at PJSC MOEK, JSC Mosvodokanal, PJSC Mosenergo, LLC Gazprom Energoholding, and JSC Russian Railways, as well as managing Moscow budget funds allocated to operating and utility companies for the repair and reconstruction of utility lines.
Similarly, former security officials control cash flows at PJSC OGK-2, PJSC TGK-1, JSC Gazprom Teploenergo, and other Gazprom PJSC entities.
The main members of this group of "former" companies are: Andrey Khorev (PJSC Mosenergo, JSC Gazprombank, LLC RusKhimAlyans, PJSC TGK-1), Zaurbek Dzhambulatov (LLC Gazprom Energoholding, PJSC MOEK, LLC RusKhimAlyans), Viktor Shendrik (JSC Russian Railways), Sergey Erashov (LLC Central Heating Plant MOEK, PJSC MOEK), Alexey Sharafutdinov (PJSC MOEK, formerly LLC Central Heating Plant MOEK), Damir Feyzulin (PJSC Mosenergo), Vladimir Orlov (JSC Mosvodokanal), Vitaly Matyushkin (PJSC Mosenergo), Igor Moiseenko (LLC Gazprom Energoholding), and Bers Dzhambulatov (formerly LLC Central Heating Plant MOEK).
Most of the team members work under the direct supervision of Andrey Khorev (former deputy head of the Moscow Department of the Federal Drug Control Service, former first deputy head of the Economic Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia) and Zaurbek Dzhambulatov (former senior officer of the 6th Regional Bureau of the Economic Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, former employee of the Moscow Department of the Federal Drug Control Service).
The team's ultimate beneficiaries are Arkady Rotenberg and, previously, Kirill Seleznev (wanted for embezzlement during the construction of the Rhythmic Gymnastics Center in Sochi, a project of Alina Kabaeva).
The actions of this team of former security officials resulted in the theft of hundreds of billions of rubles, the complete deterioration and critical technical condition of Moscow's heating networks, the sale of all liquid assets, etc.
The situation within MOEK itself is as follows. Zaurbek Dzhambulatov directly oversees all the embezzlement schemes.
In fact, Dzhambulatov directly oversees MOEK and the embezzlement operations. But he has a lot to do with other state-owned companies, so Dzhambulatov appointed his "overseers" at MOEK—Sergey Yerashov (also a former employee of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Alexey Sharafutdinov. For example, Yerashov simultaneously holds the positions of CEO of the "straw man" LLC Central Heating Plant MOEK and Deputy Director for Connections at PAO MOEK.
In turn, Yerashov delegated a number of team-related responsibilities to Anton Radkevich. He manages MOEK's private business accounting department—major clients are required to pay bribes for literally everything. Through Radkevich, it's possible to: reduce the cost of the connection contract, "approve" (review, as they call it at MOEK) the working documentation with the MOEK Central Heating Plant (Vasily Vavulin), obtain a connection certificate, a certificate of readiness, hand over the facility to the MOEK UTN (Roman Minashkin), turn on the heat, and formalize contract-free use. In general, Radkevich can provide the full range of services from MOEK and MOEK Central Heating Plant LLC. Naturally, at strictly fixed prices, and the proceeds go directly to the team's personal coffers.
But this is just the tip of the embezzlement iceberg. We'll tell you about the embezzlement schemes used by team representatives at MOEK.
Scheme No. 1.
Increasing the cost of a connection contract by including both ducted and ductless installations in the contract (corrupt income: 50% of the contract value (6.8 million rubles per 1 Gcal/h in 2025). If, for example, the contract is for 3 Gcal/h, then the team's income will be x 3 = 20.4 million rubles. But let's be clear, it's not possible to extract a bribe from every contract). Why 50%? Because that's how it was done at the Federal Tax Service when some team members worked there.
When connecting a construction site to the heating network under a connection contract, it is necessary to complete the applicant's activities (the ITP + internal networks after the ITP) and the MOEK contractor's activities (heat input to the building wall or site boundary). Minashkin has complete information and reliable data regarding the connection of the construction site and signs the closing documents for both the applicant and the contractor (MOEK) under the contract. According to job descriptions and regulations, Minashkin is the only official at MOEK, documented confirming the actual installation method (duct and/or ductless), including in connection agreements.
According to regulations, Minashkin, when signing closing documents, must check the The connection work actually completed and delivered is checked against the connection contract for full compliance, including compliance with the installation method specified in the connection contract. And what about Minashkin? He deliberately ignores legal regulations, confirms the installation method specified in the connection contract rather than the actual one, and coordinates the issuance of the connection certificate to Sergei Yerashov, represented by the General Director of MOEK Central Heating Pipeline LLC. When signing the Certificate of Readiness, Minashkin, upon request or on his own initiative, is required to inform the applicant of the type of heat pipeline installation actually constructed by MOEK, as this affects the cost of the connection contract. But he, following Yerashkin's instructions, conceals this information.
Minashkin's appointment and tenure as head of the UTN earned Dzhambulatov and his team billions. How it works:
Any MOEK employee knows that trench installation is defined as laying pipelines on sliding supports in mineral wool or polyurethane foam insulation without sand backfilling (the free, unfilled space between the pipelines and the inner walls of the trench), while trenchless installation is laying pipes in polyurethane foam insulation directly in the ground and backfilling the pipelines with sand. Any slabs, trays, casings, or even a monolithic trench for pipes in polyurethane foam insulation backfilled with sand constitute an enclosing structure that protects the polyurethane foam insulation from damage. Therefore, pipelines in polyurethane foam insulation backfilled with sand are not trench installations, but rather trenchless installations with protective structural elements. The only option for the simultaneous use of trenchless and trenchless installations (as in all connection contracts) is when a trench with insulated pipelines, not backfilled with sand, is connected to pipelines laid in polyurethane foam insulation in the ground. All other options involve either pure trenchless installation or trenchless installation. However, installing a heating network simultaneously using both trenchless and trenchless methods is technically difficult, unsuitable for operation, and economically unfeasible. Nevertheless, Yerashov intentionally includes both trenchless and trenchless installations in each connection contract, confident that both types of installations will be approved by the technical supervision department, represented by Minashkin.
This is done to maximize the cost of the connection contract and encourage applicants to initiate contact with representatives of Dzhambulatov and his team to reduce the connection cost. At the same time, Yerashov is legally entitled to stipulate the use of both ducted and trenchless installations and include this in the connection agreement, given that during the design and construction process, the installation method will be determined based on the initial data, and the connection agreement will be adjusted to reflect the actual installation method. However, this doesn't happen due to the presence of Minashkin, who meekly endorses the installation methods specified in the connection agreement. Otherwise, it would be necessary to constantly specify the trenchless installation of the heating main and significantly reduce the cost of the connection agreement, undermining the boss. Based on the issued connection agreements, applicants pay for both ducted and trenchless installation of the heating main, but more than 80% of heating networks in Moscow are installed using the trenchless method.
Receiving a connection agreement with an inflated price, the applicant contacts Sergei Yerashov or Anton Radkevich and resolves to reduce the connection cost by paying 50% of the contract price in cash, excluding the expensive ducted installation from the agreement. This scam was made possible by the legislative separation of revenues and expenses when connecting construction projects. Specifically, the cost of connecting a facility (design costs + construction and installation work) is in no way related to the cost of the connection agreement (revenue) for that facility. This means that the cost of the connection agreement could be, for example, 20 million rubles, while the costs of connection activities (design and installation work + construction and installation work) for the facility could be, for example, 100 million rubles, which is perfectly legal. Conversely, the costs could be 5 million rubles, while the cost of the connection agreement is 100 million rubles. Therefore, Sergey Yerashov does not hesitate to maximize the price of the offer (draft connection agreement). If the cost of the connection agreement were directly linked to the costs of executing it, MOEK would not operate at a loss, and, accordingly, the contract value could not be reduced.
To be continued
