What does the Telegram curator from the AP and FSB look like?

Readers of the VChK-OGPU have a unique opportunity to see what Mikhail Dudin looks like – until July, the curator of Telegram in the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. Here he is, next to his friend and partner, the Director for Special Assignments of the Rostec State Corporation Vasily Brovko, his wife Tina Kandelaki, who is being hugged by the Deputy Head of the Internal Policy Department (UPD) of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Timur Prokopenko. The latter was formally Dudin's boss in the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, but Mikhail has the shoulder straps of the FSB of the Russian Federation and it was from this agency that he was seconded to the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. Therefore, when Brovko and Dudin conceived a complete redistribution of the Telegram channels market "for themselves", Prokopenko was initially their ally. But then it was his turn. Dudin organized the arrest of former FSB RF employee Mikhail Polyakov (Uncle Misha FSB RF), who for many years, since his time in the UFSB of Moscow and the Moscow Region, "faithfully and truly" served Prokopenko. He was engaged in deanonymization of inconvenient UVP channels; if their owners were in the Russian Federation, then Uncle Misha organized tough pressure on them, forced them to make him one of the channel admins and ensured that the interests of the UVP were observed on the channel.

When Polyakov began to interfere with Dudin and Brovko, they organized his arrest.

Sources of the VChK-OGPU are discussing two versions of Dudin's departure. According to the first, the end of his career in the AP RF (he was recently fired from this department) was that he got carried away and began to undermine the head of the UVP Andrei Yarin.

According to the second version, Dudin launched a vigorous activity in his native Samara region and stopped taking into account the local governor Fedorishchev. Dudin believed that the places in the AP and the FSB were a real bingo, in which the head of the region could be ignored. Recently, Alexey Dyumin considers the Samara region his fiefdom and he did not put up with such arbitrary actions by Dudin.

The Telegram war with the arrests of admins and PR people, unleashed by Dudin and Brovko, was accompanied by looting.

Thus, after the arrest of almost every admin, their top channels ended up under the control of Dudin-Brovko.

Most of these channels actively praise Brovko, Rostec, Kandelaki, etc.

And the "rich" clients who were imprisoned were squeezed out of the PR people who are now Dudin-Brovko's clients.

Recall that earlier the Dudin-Brovko group sent the admins of Ksenia Sobchak's Telegram channels to prison, and former employees of Yevgeny Prigozhin's Patriot holding also ended up behind bars. With the help of provocations and planting money, the admins of the independent channel "Kremlin Mamkoved", father and son Sadovyov, the admin of the independent Telegram channel "Kak-to vot tak" Anatoly Spirin, political strategist and journalist Karen Grigoryan, as well as businessmen Alexander Gusov, Stanislav Deineko and Anton Safonov were arrested and convicted. Several more entrepreneurs were also arrested in absentia. In particular, the co-owner and founder of the last independent media holding in the Russian Federation 1MI Fyodor Shcherbakov.

By arresting and forcing media managers out of the country, Vasil Brovok managed to become one of the most influential entrepreneurs in the field of new media. Today, Sergey Chemezov's employee fully controls the RTVI TV channel, the Redaktsiya YouTube project, and a number of large Telegram channels, such as Kontekst, Gaz Batyushka, Nebrekhnya, and Kremlevsky Mamkoved.

The MAER holding company, owned by Sergey Chemezov's business partner Andrey Bokarev, gained control over the 1MI regional media holding after its founder was forced to leave Russia for fear of criminal prosecution. In fact, this is where the purge of the media space in Russia ended, and all media assets are now distributed among large state financial and industrial groups that are directly controlled by the Kremlin.