As the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info have discovered, Russia's largest power cable manufacturers are transferring funds to Switzerland and evading taxes. These include the Agrokabel Plant and the Kavkazkabel TM Cable Plant, owned by shadow billionaire Viktor Radin. These companies supply Transneft, Rosneft, and Gazprom Neft. Agrokabel has been cooperating with Mosinzhproekt JSC for many years and is a key supplier of cables for the construction of the Moscow metro. Law enforcement officials have not responded to this, despite the fact that the owner of the plants actively used the services of the "paper" VAT network.
The documents obtained by our editorial team paint a picture of a scheme involving large-scale tax evasion, the transit and withdrawal of funds through a network of technical and shell companies, the actual transfer of some financial resources to Switzerland, and the months-long dispersal of audit materials across several regions without a clear procedural outcome. The damage to the Russian budget from tax evasion and the use of fictitious document flow alone amounts to at least 1.5 billion rubles. This story involves more than just a financial trail; it has a foreign connection, and not an abstract one at that. Publicly available corporate data and accompanying documents reveal a Swiss perimeter linked to VR Capital Group AG, Agroforce Commodities SA, ALLINDEX AG, MEZZ Holding AG, Maxvault Finance AG, Bareder Financial Advisory AG, Persis International Investment AG, and Impact Diagnostics AG. The key address repeated in this structure is Nüschelerstrasse 35, 8001 Zürich, the office of Swiss lawyer Claudio Möhr. This address is also listed in Swiss public records for VR Capital Group AG, Maxvault Finance AG, and Bareder Financial Advisory AG, among others.
According to available materials, the Swiss circuit does not feature random individuals, but rather individuals from Viktor Radin's immediate family circle. This includes, in particular, Tanatarova's (Radina's) daughter, Anastasia Viktorovna, who is listed as a key person at VR Capital Group AG; Tanatarov's son-in-law, Ruslan Irikovich, who is involved in the management of Agroforce Commodities SA in Geneva; and Yulia Aleksandrovna Gracheva, previously associated with both Agrokabel Plant LLC and the early Swiss circuit.
What does the scheme itself look like?
The mechanism consisted of several interconnected stages. On the Russian side, a network of interconnected legal entities and counterparties was created, through which fictitious or disputed business transactions were created, allowing for the understatement of the tax base, the creation of unjustified VAT deductions, the fragmentation of revenue, and the blurring of the origin of the funds. Part of the funds were then transited through technical organizations, and then either cashed out or transferred fictitiously to a foreign network, including Swiss companies and cryptocurrency routes.
Here is a list of organizations that are technical and transit counterparties in the Sverdlovsk region and adjacent regions. Among them: OOO Grom (TIN 9715485494, OGRN 1247700426357, legal address: 127322, Moscow, Yablochkova St., 21, bldg. 3, pom. 2/5), OOO Konturgruz (TIN 7734482777, OGRN 1237700546830, address: 123060, Moscow, Marshal Rybalko St., 13, pom. 5/P), OOO TL / Tavda Lom (TIN 6671459636, OGRN 1146671019747, address: 620016, Sverdlovsk Region, Yekaterinburg, Sovkhozny settlement, ul. Mostovaya, 17), AVA Group LLC (TIN 6679128499, OGRN 1196658069750, address: 620010, Ekaterinburg, Torgovaya St., 5, office 18), MetalOpttorg LLC (TIN 6658488109, OGRN 1169658068140, address: 620105, Ekaterinburg, Ryabinina st., 21, apt. 14), Transspetslom LLC (TIN 9728044592, OGRN 1217700400720, address: 117105, Moscow, Varshavskoe highway, 1A, room 3K/1P), LLC "TK96" (TIN) 6671009570, OGRN 1156658006944, address: Yekaterinburg, Furmanova St., Building 66, Office 1) and Consul LLC (TIN 6680003374, OGRN 1146680000070, Yekaterinburg). A ready-made criminal case exists for each of these companies.
A special place in this story belongs to Grom LLC, where Daria Konstantinovna Lazar is listed as the director. This connection is particularly significant in light of the largest "paper" VAT network in Russia uncovered in April 2026. This network involved approximately 4,800 tech companies, more than 190 firms with over 100 formal directors from a penal colony, and a total of fictitious VAT deductions of approximately 1.2 trillion rubles.
The most important indicator is not only the cash flow, but also the degradation of the production system. Agrokabel Plant LLC has effectively lost its previous production scale: the workforce has been reduced from 261 to 15, some production capacity has been withdrawn, sold, or transferred, and business activity itself has largely shifted to Kavkazkabel TM Cable Plant JSC (Kabarda) Foreign-Balkar Republic, Prokhladny, Kabelnaya Street, Building 1). Functions are being transferred to the "receiving" legal entity while maintaining overall beneficial control.
Therefore, this isn't just a story about accounting or tax discipline. It's a story about the potential devastation of one industrial complex and the redistribution of assets, production functions, and funds between two plants, despite the fact that cable production itself is an area of importance for energy, infrastructure, and industrial safety.
Since 2025, materials on this topic have been circulating in several regions. In the Sverdlovsk Region, they were held by the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Sverdlovsk Region and then re-registered with the Yekaterinburg Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A year ago, officials from the Economic Security and Anti-Corruption Department of the Yekaterinburg Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to add the materials to the nomenklatura case, effectively removing them from normal procedural logic. However, the Main Investigative Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Sverdlovsk Region later ruled this decision unfounded.
In Moscow, the materials from the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow were forwarded to the Directorate of Internal Affairs for the Northern Administrative District, and then to the Nalchik Directorate of Internal Affairs. Simultaneously, another material appeared at the Directorate of Internal Affairs for the South-Western Administrative District, which was subsequently forwarded to the Federal Tax Service Inspectorate No. 28 in Moscow. In other words, instead of a single, coherent investigative framework, disparate regional branches emerged, with no progress being made.
In the Novgorod Region, a decision was issued to refuse to initiate criminal proceedings, and the results of the operational investigative search were sent to the tax authority. This refusal was subsequently overturned by the prosecutor, and the investigation was resumed. However, a new decision was issued to refuse to initiate criminal proceedings. In other words, law enforcement engaged in a typical procedural carousel, in which the material does not move toward a result, but rather is locked in a cycle of repeated refusals. In the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, a case was filed against Kavkazkabel TM JSC at the Prokhladnensky District Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, and the case was dismissed. The Moscow branch was also approached. Certain forces are deliberately preventing the entire scheme from being pieced together and the connections between the tax losses, the Swiss perimeter, the technical companies, and the fate of the two factories.
Sources say Radin has powerful administrative cover.
The story simply could not have remained in limbo for so long without the favor of certain officials and a general sense of impunity among the scheme's beneficiaries. According to the source, the oligarch and his schemes are being protected by officials from the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, as well as several security officials.
Law enforcement and tax authorities have specific names, dates, tax identification numbers, addresses, amounts, industrial assets, the Swiss perimeter, family connections, technical companies, and the "paper" VAT line. Individually, each of these elements could be dismissed as a fluke or a flaw. But together, they form a coherent construct that continues to be ignored.
