Source: www.rucriminal.info

Dear readers, today at Rucriminal.info we will talk about two glorious heroes of the Defense Industrial Bank (aka PSB). The military-industrial complex in Russia is "leaky, oblique, lame and not combat-ready." So are our heroes.

Hero 1

Musinsky Nikolai Nikolaevich - the glorious year 2019 is remembered, and our hero, like a champagne cork, flies out of the post of commander of military unit 38995 (OPU FSO). And all why? Yes, because the money was cut at the presidential construction sites (the residence of Novo-Ogaryovo). Only the one who was covered by our hero sat down for 20 years. And he covered up and closed the questions of Dmitry Mikhalchenko, head of the Forum holding. The most remarkable thing is that after his dismissal, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Board of the PSB Bank, which oversees the issues of the notorious 115-FZ On AML / CFT. And the icing on the cake is that he is responsible for the implementation of anti-corruption measures, which in itself looks comical.

And what does our deputy chairman do? Yes, the same as in positions in the FSO - it takes an absolutely passive position in protecting the interests of the Defense-Industrial Bank. He usually believes that the initiation of criminal cases against persons who deceived the Bank is a measure that is either tough or unrealistic to implement, complains about colleagues from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and he does not perceive friends from Lubyanka. According to a Rucriminal.info source, having closed himself in his office in the building of the former Roscosmosbank, Musinsky prefers expensive alcohol in a campaign of "downed pilots."

But everywhere we hide behind our "glorious fathers" (Musinsky Nikolai Stepanovich, pilot Hero of the Soviet Union).

It is clear that the case against Musinsky was hushed up and there is no criminal case, but such constructions with appointments always raise many questions not only for Musinsky himself, but also for subordinates who are within his perimeter.

Hero 2

Pronin Mikhail Sergeevich is the director of the DFM PSB, works under the leadership of Musinsky. Previously, he was THREE TIMES DISMISSED FROM PSB. In the past, Pronin was an ordinary specialist of GAZPROMBANK. The most surprising thing is that before Pronin, the DFM in the PSB was headed by another “sweet boy” (Nikolai Dronin), again under the strict guidance of Musinsky.

So, these “talents”, who do not particularly shine with professionalism and knowledge in the field of AML / CFT, occupy positions on which the safety of money, reputation, and the anti-corruption component of the PSB depend. Probably, Musinsky is satisfied with this state of affairs, because. sweet AML/CFT amateur boys easily agree to carry out any orders of the disgraced general.

 

According to the source, the leaders of the PSB should seriously think about approaches to recruiting personnel for one of the key units responsible for combating the legalization of criminal proceeds.

Service note.

 

Pronin Mikhail Sergeevich, Responsible officer - Director of the Financial Monitoring Department of PJSC Promsvyazbank.

Interaction within the framework of the work of JSC Minbank from 05.2021.

Key points of this interaction:

1. Lack of understanding of the main requirements of the Bank of Russia for Responsible employees. So, according to Pronin, one can simultaneously be a Responsible Officer in different credit institutions.

2. Poor knowledge of AML/CFT legislation. Example: CC risk interpretation. Thus, according to Pronin, the risk of KYC at the “medium” level is critical for further work with the client. However, according to the Bank of Russia, this is a criterion for in-depth verification and additional control in order to minimize the risk.

3. Inability to see the problem from different angles and build actions in multitasking mode in order to minimize the risk.

Example: Suspicious e-commerce transactions were detected in Minba. According to Pronin, the only solution is to establish incoming control over the acceptance of new clients for service, and control is exclusively on the side of the PSB employee. In my opinion, in order to solve the situation (which was implemented), it is necessary, in addition to the incoming control within the framework of concluding an agreement only for e-commerce, to establish stop factors for accepting new customers through cash settlement; to implement the "Directory of payment card numbers of individuals" previously identified in the operations of clients carrying out suspicious transactions. This method made it possible to clean up the operations of real clients from a toxic stream.

Regular monitoring of transactions and inquiries to clients on individual transactions. All this was done independently by Minbum in the context of Pronin's decision.

4. Complete unwillingness to provide assistance in solving problems.

Example: Minba had a surge in transactions on corporate cards, when he asked for help, he received the answer "we solved this, it's simple, so you decide."

At the request of the Minba to obtain from the Central Bank a list of cards of individuals involved in suspicious e-commerce transactions, the answer was received: "contact your Commissioner."

5. Inaction within the framework of the assumed powers.

Example: on the part of the PSB, an instruction was given to disconnect the partner of the bank Matin on 22.02.23; business employees sa was turned off on February 27, 23, but there was no reaction from Pronin.

12/24/22. Pronin found that in case of detection of suspicious transactions in the framework of e-commerce, he would take all measures to prevent these transactions. On 01/19/23, during a personal meeting (there is an audio recording), he announced that on 12/25/22 he knew about suspicious transactions and was silent, watched the actions of Minba.

On February 10, 23 at a meeting at the Central Bank, he did not utter a word, although he had been engaged in integration processes since May 2021. All claims in the work of the Minba by the Central Bank are not the result of his work.

6. Inability to organize the work of their own department and give clear criteria for work in the framework of interaction with the Minb.

Example: So, when analyzing Minba clients, the PSB employees do not give any reasons for the decisions made, they demand in an ultimatum to make a refusal or disconnect the client, while these actions, if they are clearly performed, will lead to complaints and appeals from clients to the Central Bank, where the Minb will not be able to legally refer to the decision of the PSB officer. Therefore, in working within the framework of such decisions, Minba employees first of all comply with the norms of the law in order to reduce reputational risks.

Inability to organize the work of their own department and give clear criteria for work in the framework of interaction with the Minb.

Example: So, when analyzing Minba clients, the PSB employees do not give any reasons for the decisions made, they demand in an ultimatum to make a refusal or disconnect the client, while these actions, if they are clearly performed, will lead to complaints and appeals from clients to the Central Bank, where the Minb will not be able to legally refer to the decision of the PSB officer. Therefore, in working within the framework of such decisions, Minba employees first of all comply with the norms of the law in order to reduce reputational risks.

Using non-business communication with customers when making requests. For example, Minbu was asked to send a request to the client for his counterparty, a legal entity, with the wording “give written explanations of how you met”.

6. Inability (unwillingness) to build work with a real client. It is in the practice of the PSB to refuse all transactions of clients that, in the opinion of the PSB, are suspicious, and at the same time continue to serve the client without any restrictions, which is a violation of the requirements of AML / CFT legislation. Example: LLC Orlovsky cable plant TIN 5752050600.

To be continued

Alexey Ermakov

Source: www.rucriminal.info