Русская Мафия: эксклюзивные материалы https://rucriminal.info/en Портал об олигархах, преступниках, взяточниках, чиновниках, ворах в законе. https://rucriminal.info/design/yandex.png https://rucriminal.info/design/yandex.png Fri, 28 Mar 2025 20:23:05 +0000 Revelations of &quot;Uncle Misha&quot; - the Kremlin&#039;s head admin of Telegram https://rucriminal.info/en/material/otkroveniya-dyadi-mishi-kremlevskogo-glavadmina-telegrama https://rucriminal.info/en/material/otkroveniya-dyadi-mishi-kremlevskogo-glavadmina-telegrama How the FSB Internal Security Directorate hunted for the deputy head of the Internal Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Timur Prokopenko Fri, 28 Mar 2025 20:23:05 +0000 article <p>The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel has obtained all the testimonies given during the investigation by former FSB Colonel Mikhail Polyakov (Uncle Misha FSB). These testimonies are a real encyclopedia of how the Internal Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation and one of the &quot;towers&quot; of the FSB of the Russian Federation (ZKS and Co.) took control of dozens of the most popular Russian channels in Telegram. By the way, there were no &quot;seizures&quot; of SIM cards, kidnappings of owners, etc. Everything happened in a more mundane manner. He named &quot;Uncle Misha&quot; and the network of power channels under his control. For example, our readers will be able to find out who was the admin of two channels that were engaged in deanonymizing the owners of Telegram channels, posting their personal data, etc. This was done by Polyakov&#39;s friend, a full-time adviser to the Minister of Education. However, then something went wrong in the well-oiled mechanism. The Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation (or rather someone powerful who could give them the command &quot;sic &#39;em&quot;) decided to change the &quot;rules of the game&quot; in Telegram. The main target of the Internal Security Directorate was Uncle Misha&#39;s good friend - Deputy Head of the Internal Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration Timur Prokopenko. But in the end, only Polyakov will have to go to jail.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>&quot;From 1991 to 2021, I carried out my work activities in the FSB of the Russian Federation. My last position was the head of the service for the protection of the constitutional order of the FSB Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region. ... Then I carried out my work activities on various projects of the Internal Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation,&quot; Polyakov briefly described his biography to the investigator.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>According to him, at one time (he does not give the exact date), &ldquo;the administration of the President of the Russian Federation, having the order of the President of the Russian Federation&rdquo; (Putin and Peskov previously stated that the President does not read Telegram channels and does not use a mobile phone at all) gave the go-ahead to the FSB of the Russian Federation to establish the owners of the largest anonymous channels. Polyakov himself and his colleagues were engaged in this by virtue of their service; reports were compiled on each channel and its established owners and admins. Then Polyakov, according to him, personally met with the owners of the channels that were also available in Russia. &ldquo;Previously, these Telegram channels wrote posts about the political situation in a negative format, but after I found them, they began to write in a positive format,&rdquo; Polyakov boasts. After each such meeting, Polyakov was also granted administrator rights for the Telegram channel with whose owner he had spoken. In total, Polyakov received access to several dozen leading Telegram channels. In Telegram, before his arrest, he used the pseudonyms ZOV and ALEX. As Polyakov himself states, he needed the functions of an administrator &quot;for the purpose of timely removal of negative information on the instructions of the administration of the President of the Russian Federation.&quot;</p> <p>Mikhail Polyakov assures that he needed access to the admin panels of the Telegram channel exclusively for censorship, but &quot;for the soul&quot; he was an admin in the channels: &quot;Soloviev Live&quot;, &quot;Siloviki&quot;, &quot;338&quot;, &quot;Oper Slil&quot;. &quot;As an administrator of the said Telegram channels, I can &quot;repost&quot;, &quot;post&quot;, and also write various articles,&quot; Polyakov said during interrogation. Also, &quot;Uncle Misha&quot; spoke about the channels where he was the owner. This is &quot;Kremlin Laundress&quot;. In addition, according to Polyakov, he owns the channel &quot;True Truth&quot;, which is hosted by his son Maxim. By the way, &quot;True Truth&quot; is literally and figuratively a related channel to the channel &quot;Two Majors&quot;.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Polyakov also admitted that he is the owner of the channel &quot;Postovoy&quot; (this network also included &quot;Shum priboy&quot;, &quot;Rokot&quot;, &quot;Rodina slyat&quot;.). During the first Telegram war, all these channels deanonymized the owners and admins of various channels, posted their personal data - addresses, phone numbers, etc. Now it is clear that Polyakov led this process. During interrogation, he named the admin of &quot;Postovoy&quot; and others. It turned out to be Rusakov Igor Borisovich, whom Polyakov introduces as a close friend. According to Rusakov&#39;s biography, until 2013 he served in the RF Armed Forces, then from 2013 to 2021 he was an assistant to the Minister of Education and Science, from 2023 to 2024 he worked in the department of the ANO &quot;Directorate of the World Youth Festival&quot; (recall that Polyakov was deputy director of the ANO), and is now the vice-rector for security at MSTU STANKIN. According to the VChK-OGPU, Rusakov is now directly related to the same channel &quot;Two Majors&quot;, which Mikhail Polyakov personally launched while still at large.</p> <p>During the search, Polyakov was found to have a permanent pass to the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation and a large sum of money. &quot;The funds confiscated from me during the search were received by me at the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation to pay salaries for special projects supervised by me,&quot; Polyakov explained during interrogation.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>However, as follows from the testimony, by May 2023, the clouds began to thicken over Polyakov and his curators. Thus, Polyakov learns from the owner of one of the major channels that he was detained by FSB officers, taken to &quot;some building not far from Lubyanka&quot; and &quot;pressed&quot; and &quot;pressed&quot; for 8 hours, demanding to show on Polyakov himself and the deputy head of the Department for Internal Policy of the Presidential Administration Timur Prokopenko. Prokopenko is a long-time acquaintance of Polyakov and is considered one of the curators of Telegram from the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation. Polyakov photographed the entire correspondence (in which the deputy head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Sergei Kiriyenko was also repeatedly mentioned) and hurried with it to Prokopenko.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>However, it was not possible to &quot;fight back&quot;. In July 2023, former colleagues came for Polyakov himself. As follows from his testimony, the 2nd service of the FSB Internal Security Directorate was working against him. It carries out counterintelligence activities in the units of the central office of the FSB of the Russian Federation. The &quot;two&quot; detained hackers from &quot;Shaltai-Boltai&quot;, the head of the 2nd department of the FSB Central Security Directorate Colonel Sergei Mikhailov, etc.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>It turned out that it was the 2nd service of the FSB Internal Security Directorate that had been &ldquo;developing&rdquo; Polyakov, Prokopenko and other Telegram curators in recent years.</p> <p>&ldquo;Crimes have been committed against me&hellip;. On July 14, 2023, at 07:00, armed men in masks burst into the address&hellip;, as I later learned from the security unit of the FSB of the Russian Federation, knocked me down, twisted my arms, slammed me into all the corners, dragged me into the kitchen, pushed me into the radiator and began to hit me on the head, legs, and body. They shoved my phone in my face and demanded that I give them the password. They strangled me! &rdquo;- this is how one of two statements about the crime by FSB Colonel Mikhail Polyakov (Uncle Misha FSB), who, for the Internal Policy Department (IPD) of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, identified the owners of Telegram channels and then forced them to make him an administrator. Polyakov, in the interests of the UVP, could delete or post any post at any time in several dozen channels.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>However, this situation did not suit someone very powerful, and the 2nd service of the Internal Security Department of the FSB - one of the most secret units of the FSB of the Russian Federation - took on Polyakov and the deputy head of the UVP Timur Prokopenko. The officers who broke into Polyakov&#39;s, as can be seen from Polyakov&#39;s testimony, were interested in access to his phone, access to admin panels, all correspondence, etc. Moreover, they promised to take Uncle Misha out into the forest and burn him alive. And they beat him. As a result, he provided not only the requested data, but told everything he knew about the owners, admins of the channels known to him. Polyakov also, according to him, filmed all his correspondence in secret chats with the channel owners on his phone and he also handed over the footage. He told the details of his relationship with Prokopenko, Kristina Potupchik and others. After that, by the way, Uncle Misha ceased to be interesting to the two.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/mpolyakov/%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%20%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpg" style="height:654px; width:450px" /></p> <p>He himself wrote two statements. The first one is about the fact that the employees of the 2nd Service illegally pursued and developed him and Prokopenko. The second one is about the illegal use of violence.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>We publish the continuation of Polyakov&#39;s testimony about how they beat the necessary information out of him after his arrest:</p> <p>&quot;I said that I had a bad heart, but they did not let me take a pill. They twisted my arms, put me in a car, threw a T-shirt over my head and drove away. On the way, they continued to tighten my handcuffs. At the same time, they said: &quot;Now we will take you to the forest, burn you alive and bury you.&quot; Then in the car, they threw me face down on the floor between the seats. I began to lose consciousness... In the investigator&#39;s office, they continued to twist my arms, demanding the password to the phone. I gave the passwords... I gave the passwords to an employee of the 2nd Service of the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation.&quot;</p> <p>Rucriminal.info publishes interesting quotes from the testimony of &quot;Uncle Misha&quot;:</p> <p>&quot;Since about 2021, I have been the owner and administrator of the telegram channel &quot;Kremlin Laundress&quot; under the account (pseudonym) &quot;ZOV&quot;. In the description of the specified telegram channel there is a link for communication (https://t.me/kremlinprachka). The specified link is registered to the subscriber number of my wife Polyakova Natalya Alekseevna ... since she does not have the application installed, she does not use it. On the specified telegram channel, I personally publish patriotic articles, about 10 articles per day. I write the text alone, no one helps me. Also, for a certain fee, at the suggestion of various citizens, I publish articles (post) for an average of 45,000 rubles, and for 35,000 rubles I carried out a &quot;repost&quot;. My specified channel currently has 259,700 subscribers.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I am also the owner and administrator of the telegram channel &quot;Postovoy&quot; under the account (pseudonym) &quot;ZOV&quot;. In the description of the specified telegram channel there is a link for communication &quot;postovoitapic&quot;, and feedback is carried out through my friend Rusakov Igor Borisovich, who runs this telegram channel. On the specified telegram channel, Rusakov I.B. publishes patriotic articles. He also writes the text, and finds the content of these texts in various media. Also, for a certain price, at the suggestion of various citizens, he publishes articles (post) for an average of 20,000 rubles. Currently, there are approximately 44,000 subscribers.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/mpolyakov/%D0%A0%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%20%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpg" style="height:654px; width:450px" /></p> <p>In addition, I am the owner and administrator of the telegram channel &quot;Truthful Truth&quot;. On the specified telegram channel, my son Polyakov Maxim Mikhailovich and I publish patriotic articles. The text is sometimes written by me, sometimes by my son Polyakov M.M., the content of these texts we find in various media, as well as &quot;repost&quot; our own publications in our above-mentioned channels. We do not accept funds for publications and articles on the specified telegram channel. The specified channel currently has approximately 26,000 subscribers....</p> <p>I can also say that I am an administrator in the following telegram channels: &quot;Soloviev. Live&quot;, &quot;Siloviki&quot;, &quot;338&quot;, &quot;Oper Slil&quot;. As an administrator of the specified telegram channels, I can &quot;repost&quot;, &quot;post&quot;. and also write various articles on patriotic topics for free....</p> <p>I am an administrator of telegram channels... for the purpose of removing negative information at the direction of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation...</p> <p>I can also add that I identified the owners of telegram channels at the direction of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, having the order of the President of the Russian Federation to do so. ...</p> <p>The funds seized from me during the search were received by me from the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation to issue salaries to special projects.&quot;&nbsp;</p> <p>Timofey Grishin</p> <p>To be continued</p> From FIFA 2018 to the Russian Interior Ministry dormitory https://rucriminal.info/en/material/ot-fifa-2018-do-obshhagi-mvd-rf https://rucriminal.info/en/material/ot-fifa-2018-do-obshhagi-mvd-rf &quot;Qualified employees in the police are treated like cattle&quot; Thu, 27 Mar 2025 20:46:18 +0000 article <p>As the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info learned, searches may soon be conducted at the former head of the All-Russian Institute for Advanced Training of the Russian Interior Ministry (Domodedovo), retired police colonel Ilya Bondar, who was sentenced in 2023 to a two-year suspended sentence. He was &quot;pulled&quot; into charges of abuse of power in spending funds allocated for the accommodation of foreign police officers during FIFA 2018.</p> <p>The suspended sentence expires in May of this year, which explains the very moment of the appearance of the new criminal opus. As our sources tell us, the employees of the FSB Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation are still pushing this story. Now they plan to charge Bondar with the fact that his subordinates allegedly illegally lived in the dormitory of his institute. This was back during the end of FIFA, in 2018. Given the shortage and low qualifications of local regional staff, teachers were recruited to the institute from all over the country (from more than 20 regions) and, of course, in the event of a move, they were provided with a dormitory under a sublease agreement with payment for accommodation. However, the investigation is trying to prove that the teachers transferred to the institute had to pay for a room in a dormitory (with a shared toilet) not like other employees of the institute at 5-7 thousand per month, but as travelers - 550 rubles per day (17 thousand per month)! This is despite the fact that the rates are determined by the institute itself!</p> <p>In 2020, after the initiation of the first criminal case and the expulsion of Bondar from the All-Russian Institute of Advanced Training, new teachers were thrown out of the dormitory and most of them resigned from the service. &quot;Isn&#39;t it because the Ministry of Internal Affairs is so wildly understaffed that qualified police officers are treated like cattle for the sake of momentary political intrigues, while they look into the mouths of their FSB supervisors? After all, in court, the Ministry of Internal Affairs representatives, having forgotten about the real interests of the department, will again talk about how they could have extorted 10 thousand more from their employees,&quot; a source of the VChK-OGPU believes. We are closely following the developments. We will tell you soon how the searches will be conducted and what exactly will be brought in the charges.&quot; And this is information from Rucriminal.info about the reasons for the second criminal case.</p> <p>Echoes of the 2018 World Cup are still wandering like an unceasing echo through the echoing high offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB and the Investigative Committee. As we wrote earlier, in 2018 our country could have embarrassed itself in a big way: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, having received 250 million rubles, was supposed to prepare a base for foreign police officers, but the money (in front of the eyes and in the silence of the FSB curators) went according to plan, and the base (the Institute of the Higher Professional Education in Domodedovo) was not prepared 3 weeks before the start of FIFA. The FSB could then kill 3 birds with one stone: with the help of the controlled rear services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, seize a quarter of a billion, cut down a lot of high-profile corruption sticks on innocent lower performers (the Higher Professional Education), and most importantly, hang the figures Kolokoltsev, Gorovoy, Kubyshko, as those who failed to cope and failed the high political task.</p> <p>Generals with apparatus experience immediately ran away from the institute. But in the last weeks the Ministry of Internal Affairs found a young and inexperienced manager (Colonel Bondar) and with the words &quot;Son, the Motherland is in danger!&quot; sent him to finish the repairs. And he did it. And at the same time made himself a flock of &quot;friends&quot; in the person of the FSB Directorate &quot;M&quot; and the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Shulika, controlled by the emka.</p> <p>Bondar began inspections along the rear line (Accounts Chamber, Control and Audit Office, Treasury, Main Directorate of Internal Security) which did not reveal any critical violations. But Shulika sent his inspectors, who, under the dictation of the FSB, wrote a &quot;devastating&quot; report, turning the facts upside down. It turned out that the VIPK did not need repair work, and the repairs themselves were carried out late - beyond the contract terms. And instead of hanging the debts on the contractor (part of the money was already gone), Bondar, having imposed penalties and fines, achieved the completion of the repair work.</p> <p>Based on the results of the inspection, a criminal case was opened, which by 2023 ended with a suspended sentence for Bondar. And in 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs also filed a civil lawsuit against him for 90 million (!) And this is for the repairs (insulation of facades, video surveillance system, new windows, etc.), which are now in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and are used by it for their intended purpose.</p> <p>But this turned out to be not enough, as soon as the absurdity of the &quot;damage&quot; became obvious in the appeal, which means that the criminal case can also have a reversal, our &quot;honest officer&quot; General Shulika asks his curators in the Directorate &quot;M&quot; of the FSB of the Russian Federation to open another criminal case against Bondar (so that he does not yelp).</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/ibondar/%D0%9F%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%BE%20%D0%A4%D0%A1%D0%91%201.jpg" style="height:719px; width:450px" /></p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/ibondar/%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%BE%202.jpg" style="width:450px" /></p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/ibondar/%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BC%D0%BE%203.jpg" style="height:346px; width:450px" /></p> <p>To be continued</p> <p>Arseny Dronov</p> How Viktor Vekselberg was &quot;milked&quot; https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-doili-viktora-vekselberga https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-doili-viktora-vekselberga Top managers &quot;cheated&quot; the oligarch in the solar business Wed, 26 Mar 2025 19:52:32 +0000 article <p>The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info continue to acquaint readers with the embezzlement in the oligarch Viktor Vekselberg&#39;s holdings. In the first part of the investigation, we talked about the director of Unigrin Energy Igor Shakhrai, who made a good profit by taking the helm of the solar business and lobbying for the construction of a plant that no one needed in a hard-to-reach region.</p> <p>However, Shakhrai was not able to cope with the construction of the plant on time, the construction was delayed for about a year, while the budget almost doubled (the cost increased several times 18 billion - 24 billion - 29 billion - 34 billion rubles). And when in January 2024 problems emerged in the course of preparations for the launch of the plant, the chief auditor Belykh, whom we already know, instead of reporting the problems to shareholders, personally came to Kaliningrad to clean up the documents and plant the &ldquo;correct&rdquo; ones. At the same time, problems with the fulfillment of KPIs arose for Bodnarchuk, and Belykh, who was responsible for monitoring the fulfillment of KPIs in the company, turned a blind eye to the failures of her friend Bodnarchuk and, at Shakhrai&rsquo;s request, changed the failed KPI criteria to more lenient ones. The bonus was suddenly paid out at 100%. Everyone in the company began to whisper about the impudence and permissiveness of Shakhrai and Bodnarchuk.</p> <p>After the pompous opening of the plant with the participation of Putin (via video link), the huge plant could barely be launched, many components did not have time to arrive, the plant is still 80% idle. In addition, at the moment, the only way of logistical communication with Kaliningrad is only the waterway (on barges), which means constant unprofitability of products from such a region.</p> <p>In fact, the money was rolled into concrete and Shakhrai, just in case, had to clean up the ranks of witnesses. After an hour-long conversation between Shakhrai and Bodnarchuk, a decision is made to dismiss the latter from her post. In order to save face for the entire &quot;gang&quot;, Bodnarchuk is agreed upon a severance bonus of millions of rubles and given a beautiful send-off. Her deputy, an important witness to all the actions, is also removed. At the same time, a new procurement director, Ekaterina Sergeevna Sukhanova, is quickly hired. According to a source of Rucriminal.info, Shakhrai deliberately appoints a weak specialist without the necessary experience, who screws up all the processes and, in the excitement of the fallen power, begins to try to go and renegotiate with suppliers for her 1-2%. But against her background, all suspicions are removed from Bodnarchuk, and she safely moves to sunny Spain, where she controls the receipt of kickback payments under old contracts.</p> <p>It seemed that life was getting better, but at the beginning of 2025, the nominee Mikhail Sivoldayev &ldquo;unexpectedly&rdquo; died suddenly, which was a complete surprise for Shakhrai. There was no one left to protect him and he was seriously scared. He still regularly goes to work and tries to save face, but is already actively looking for buyers for his real estate in Moscow.</p> <p>One can only wonder how a person who set up such a subtle and almost imperceptible scheme for receiving kickbacks could ruin such an important energy sector for the country. Shakhrai was so carried away by his business that over the past year he stopped delving into business problems and forgot to at least occasionally hold regular morning meetings, but did not forget to upgrade the latest Mercedes S class for himself with the company&#39;s crisis money.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Arseniy Dronov</p> <p>To be continued</p> How the servants of Themis built a seven-story building at a resort https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-slujiteli-femidy-semietajnyy-dom-na-kurorte-stroili https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-slujiteli-femidy-semietajnyy-dom-na-kurorte-stroili The head of the judicial mafia hopes for &quot;friends in the trade&quot; Tue, 25 Mar 2025 21:13:11 +0000 article <p>The trial of the lawsuit of the Prosecutor General&#39;s Office of the Russian Federation against the former chairman of the Krasnodar Regional Court Alexander Chernov is ongoing in the Vidnoye City Court of the Moscow Region. On March 20, the Prosecutor General&#39;s Office increased the amount of the claim. And although the current amount of the additionally identified property is not disclosed, we will risk assuming that neither the initial amount of the property and land &quot;complex&quot; of Chernov and his accomplices of 7 billion, nor the current &quot;extended list&quot; are final. In particular, the Prosecutor General&#39;s Office has not yet shown interest in Chernov&#39;s property in Germany, which he last went to &quot;inspect&quot; right before the start of the SVO.</p> <p>The prosecutor&#39;s office has filed a new lawsuit against the chairman of the Krasnodar Regional Court Alexander Chernov. On March 11, 2025, the Sochi prosecutor&#39;s office filed a lawsuit against Chernov and three other defendants for damages in the amount of over 50 million rubles.</p> <p>As follows from the lawsuit, which is at the disposal of the VChK-OGPU telegram channel and Rucriminal.info, Alexander Chernov, being the current chairman of the regional court, together with other co-defendants, erected a 7-story apartment building in the very center of the resort. Naturally, when you are the chairman of the regional court, it is not at all necessary to obtain a building permit. The house, in the best traditions of the resort, was legalized by the Khostinsky District Court (Judge Pilipenko), which has invaluable experience in this matter, the chairman of which at that time was Chernov&#39;s old friend Bakhmetyev.</p> <p>What is noteworthy is that the latter is also among the co-defendants.</p> <p>Subsequently, Chernov and his accomplices sold apartments in it, extracted excess profits, and the municipality was given the responsibility to provide social infrastructure, which caused the latter corresponding losses.</p> <p>On the same day, the claim was accepted for proceedings by the Adler Court and all the property of the defendants was seized.</p> <p>What is noteworthy in this case is not even the figure of Chernov himself in the now familiar role of defendant in claims by the prosecutor&#39;s office or other co-defendants (note: among the co-defendants are Bakhmetyev V.N., who previously held the positions of chairman of the Central and Khostinsky district courts of Sochi, Syrtsova L.V., Sukhareva E.V.), but the unprecedented level of publicity and openness of the proceedings with his participation.</p> <p>Alexander Dmitrievich himself, in all likelihood, is only at the very beginning of the path to accepting his fate and is counting on his deep-rooted corrupt connections. In this case, he again turned to his old friends from among the still active representatives of the judicial branch, V.V. Momotov, A.S. Kharlamov, A.V. Gusev and others.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/judges/2/%D0%A5%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpg" style="height:255px; width:450px" /></p> <p>Acting according to the already rehearsed scenario, on March 17, 2025, A.D. Chernov filed a petition with the Adler Court to send the case to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation for consideration by the Krasnogorsk City Court of the Moscow Region.</p> <p>Most likely, this time, old friends will not abandon Chernov and, in order to avoid emergency situations, will send the case closer to themselves in the Moscow Region, where a multi-billion dollar lawsuit from the Prosecutor General&#39;s Office of the Russian Federation against him in connection with the violation of anti-corruption prohibitions is already being considered. And in this situation, one can even understand the chairmen of the Adler District and Krasnodar Regional Courts, who, realizing that the Supreme Court itself is already waiting for this case, and perhaps having already received the relevant instructions from there by telephone, are hardly ready to risk their careers by refusing Chernov.</p> <p>In this regard, some lines from Chernov&#39;s petition sound like a confession: &quot;... the long period of Chernov A.D.&#39;s stay in the specified position, his personal authority, as well as the significance and role of the defendant in the formation and development of the judicial system and the entire judicial community of the Krasnodar Territory, may cast doubt on the decisions made by the courts of the region, regardless of their essence, since the impartiality and disinterestedness of judges will not be ensured.&quot; This is how we need to develop the judicial system and the judicial community of all impartiality...</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/judges/2/%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpg" style="height:478px; width:450px" /></p> <p>In connection with such increased attention to the activities of the Chernov clan, according to Rucriminal.info, Chernov&#39;s first wife, the president of the notary chamber of the Krasnodar Territory Galina Chernova and a number of her accomplices, may also end up under investigation.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>And this is connected with the case of the &quot;black&quot; Kuban realtors and notaries (and one of the key figures in numerous apartment scams is precisely Chernova). In this criminal case, practically destroyed by the Kuban Investigative Committee and the judges, an unexpected turn occurred, finally explaining the entire circus work of both law enforcement officers and courts on the mass fraud with housing of elderly residents of the Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of Adygea.</p> <p>One of the apartments taken away from the elderly by the swindlers belongs to... the family of the Krasnodar regional (at the time the investigation began), and now the best investigator of the Rostov Investigative Committee, Evgeny Chernoskutov! New facts were revealed during the investigation of the property and<span style="font-family:helvetica; font-size:11px"> </span>the Prosecutor General&#39;s Office to the former Chief Judge of the Krasnodar Territory, Alexander Chernov.</p> <p>We have already reported on this high-profile crime more than once. During the pandemic, a team of black realtors rewrote dozens of apartments and houses of lonely elderly residents of Krasnodar, Sochi, and Maikop &quot;in their own name.&quot; The swindlers failed to hush up the fraud worth tens of millions of rubles for one reason - the story became known to journalists, to whom honest Krasnodar employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were able to convey this gloomy fact.</p> <p>Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is the area of ​​responsibility of the police. But just at that time, a new head came to the regional Investigative Committee - Maslov. Who ensured that the case was transferred to the service entrusted to him. The story, which made a splash on all central TV channels, was called resonant by them, and requiring investigation by investigators of the Investigative Committee.</p> <p>It seemed that for the new boss, a thorough, complete investigation of these crimes is an excellent opportunity to show his professionalism and loyalty to serving the law. But the Kuban Investigative Committee &quot;company&quot;, having seized this case, in fact did everything possible to collapse it, so that the guilty would not suffer real punishment.</p> <p>So, no matter what the initial good intentions of Maslov were, the influence and connections of the Chernovskys turned out to be much stronger than the requirements of Russian legislation.</p> <p>As a result, the fragmented and greatly curtailed case was still transferred to the courts. The meager exhaust of all these wonderful Investigative Committee efforts already at that moment raised many questions.</p> <p>Question one: why was the case of the &quot;black notary&quot; Tamara Tsikunib, who issued all the notarial powers of attorney for the swindlers on behalf of the supposedly &quot;sick&quot; old people, singled out for separate proceedings? And why was Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (fraud on an especially large scale), which she more than deserved, replaced with the more lenient Article 202, which only deals with abuse of office by notaries? Why was Galina Timofeevna Chernova, the first wife of Alexander Dmitrievich Chernov, not among the defendants in the criminal case? After all, the &quot;draftsman&quot; of the fake powers of attorney - Tamara Tsikunib - is only Chernova&#39;s assistant, and the multi-million dollar fraud is clearly not on the scale of some assistant. And the fact that each &quot;fake&quot; power of attorney was certified with Chernova&#39;s personal seal also somehow went practically unnoticed.</p> <p>The investigation established from the very beginning that all the &quot;fake&quot; was drawn up in Chernova&#39;s notary office. And even her name was mentioned about four dozen times in the final version of the case materials. But the conclusion was surprising: Chernova, according to the investigators, was &quot;not in the know.&quot; In total, she was &quot;not in the know&quot; two dozen times.</p> <p>The question was also raised by the fact that the court hearings on the more than obvious case of Tamara Tsikunib, which were conducted by the judge of the Pervomaisky District Court Eduard Lameikin, were postponed more than 20 times for some far-fetched reasons!!! From December 2020 to January 2023. Until the judges finally got the opportunity to throw the case in the trash on a completely legal basis - after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for this article.</p> <p>The current question: why are colleagues of the Pervomaisky judges from the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar now continuing the circus with court hearings on the case of another leader of the organized criminal group - the real estate gypsy bandit - Galina Zhestovskaya and her other accomplices? These court hearings have already been postponed 119 times!!! Since 2021, the case has not moved from the &quot;planned&quot; dead point. At the very beginning of the investigation, sensing the prospect of a 10-year prison term, a certain Gennady Rozhikhin, a member of an organized crime group, escaped and was put on the wanted list. One of the swindlers, in many cases the first buyer of apartments squeezed out of veterans. Who eventually got in front of the bright eyes of the judges. An additional trial was quickly organized for him, and Rozhikhin was... released after he fervently repented. In connection with this, such humanism happened among the judges, while they quite easily hand down sentences for many years of imprisonment for much less significant crimes? It seems that this murky investigative and judicial puzzle is now helping to put together into a single understandable, albeit rather disgusting, picture one apartment, clearly not intended for publicity by the employees of the Kuban Investigative Committee. Its address: Krasnodar, Kotovsky St., 94, apt. 44. Initially, the owner of the housing was Nina Prokofyevna Risun, born on December 24, 1927. For some reason, this apartment, also &ldquo;tired out&rdquo; by the Chernovsky-Zhestovsky organized criminal group, was not among those seven episodes that dragged themselves to the courts, nor even among the full list of a couple of dozen apartments and houses &ldquo;rewritten&rdquo; for the swindlers, which was originally in the Investigative Committee&rsquo;s case materials.</p> <p>It is generally understandable why the number of episodes was suddenly reduced by three times - a vigorous investigation was carried out either on those apartments where the owners were eager for fair punishment of the criminals. And deleting these episodes, given that the old men wrote appeals to Bastrykin and even Putin, could have led to some trouble. Another part of the episodes that reached the court odes concerned those grandparents who either had problems with their heads due to their age, or... had already died.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Now we can provide a complete list of apartments, both those left in the final version of the &quot;investigation&quot; and those &quot;crossed out&quot; by the investigators of the regional Investigative Committee.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>From this entire more than proven list, only seven very &quot;convenient&quot; episodes for the Chernovsky organized criminal group ultimately made it to court: the housing of Zenkova, Mozalevsky, Zakharov. Veprikov, Sundukov, Bondarenko, Kovalev.</p> <p>And even in such a strongly truncated, &quot;seven-episode&quot; version, it would seem, what problems: the evidence base seemed to be enough to consider, pass at least some kind of sentence, and move on along the path of glorious Kuban judicial accomplishments. But all this investigative and judicial red tape continues and continues to this day. Since December 2021, when the Kuban Investigative Committee began working on this case. Considering that the statute of limitations for Article 159, the article imputed to Zhestovskaya and her accomplices, is 10 years, it is unlikely that this part of the OPS will be extended by the statute of limitations. It seems that they are counting on something else... on the natural loss of plaintiffs. The calculation is generally correct: a considerable number of grandfathers have already passed away without ever hearing &quot;The court is about to rise... To announce the verdict...&quot;.</p> <p>But after, fortunately, not the Kuban Investigative Committee began to look closely at the financial achievements of Alexander Dmitrievich Chernov, the apartment of Nina Prokofyevna Risun&#39;s grandmother, which had not been noticed by the investigation, surfaced as an unexpected &quot;side story&quot;.</p> <p>Let&#39;s say right away that the apartment is shady. Judging by the number of prison terms that the grandmother&#39;s grandson has served, it is possible that this was a criminal underworld. The grandson, Alexander Dolgikh, was convicted several times. Theft, robbery, drugs. In April 1997, by the verdict of the Soviet District Court of Krasnodar, he was convicted under Part 2 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation to 3 years (suspended). Later, the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar passed a sentence under a whole set of articles: Part 2 of Article 161, Article 213 and Article 69 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In 2006, the Leninsky District Court of Krasnodar already considered the 228th. In 2017, the same 228th - illegal drug trafficking (the case was considered by the Prikubansky District Court of Krasnodar). But the &quot;bad apartment&quot; was located in a good area of ​​​​the city. And the apartment was well known to law enforcement officers. There were no problems with its seizure. The second, so to speak, buyer of the apartment of grandmother Risun is Tatyana Zaitseva - the wife of Evgeny Chernoskutov, at that time an employee of the Kuban Investigative Committee, and now the head of the second department for especially important cases of the Don Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. Here he is in the photo. He gives an interview to the radio &quot;Komsomolskaya Pravda - Rostov-on-Don&quot; about the successes in the fight against bribery and embezzlement.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The same scheme was used. A power of attorney issued in the notary office of Chernova in the name of the right to dispose of funds and real estate. Then the &quot;sale&quot; of the apartment to the &quot;on-duty&quot; swindler-buyer. And then the delivery of the housing to Zaitseva, drawn up in the form of a &quot;sale&quot;. Zaitseva in the scheme was already listed as a &quot;bona fide purchaser&quot;.</p> <p>To be continued</p> <p>Timofey Grishin</p> Why does the Chaika clan need Rossotrudnichestvo https://rucriminal.info/en/material/zachem-klanu-chayki-rossotrudnichestvo https://rucriminal.info/en/material/zachem-klanu-chayki-rossotrudnichestvo &quot;The Plenipotentiary Representative fears that he will be removed from his post and asked uncomfortable questions.&quot; Mon, 24 Mar 2025 20:35:25 +0000 article <p>The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info continue to publish an investigation into the assistant to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus Federal District, Yuri Chaika, and at the same time his trusted person in the sphere of business and personnel - Aidamir Valiev.</p> <p><strong><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/avaliev/4/%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B2%2022%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpg" style="height:300px; width:450px" /></strong></p> <p>As it turned out, numerous investigations against Valiev do not have much effect not because of the person of his boss Chaika. Valiev has a higher cover. We are talking about the Deputy Director of the FSB of the Russian Federation Alexei Sedov.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/avaliev/4/%D0%A7%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BA%D0%B8%20%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8C%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpeg" style="height:301px; width:450px" /></p> <p>According to sources, Deputy Director Sedov is a long-time comrade from their joint service in one department - the Federal Drug Control Service - with the Chairman of the Public Chamber of the Republic of Dagestan Azizbek Cherkesov. The Cherkesov family has been friends with the Valiev family for a long time, and Azizbek Cherkesov&#39;s son, Rashidbek Cherkesov, is a long-time friend and close business partner of Aidamir Valiev.</p> <p>Their common main company is SGT-CAPITAL LLC, INN: 7705555854, Legal address: Legal address: 121099, Moscow, Novinsky Boulevard, 11A, building 1, where Rashidbek Azizbekovich Cherkesov, who is also the founder, is listed as the general director, and the second founder of the company is Aidamir Aleksandrovich Valiev himself, who, after repeated falsification of declarations of a civil servant, was forced to register his share of 20 percent in the name of a fictitious person, a certain Anna Nikolaevna Ivanova.</p> <p>According to available information, Cherkesov (the son of the closest friend of the deputy director of the FSB Alexei Sedov) and Valiev, using their established connections with Kireev (a participant in the schemes to embezzle funds from the former Presidential Property Management Department of the Russian Federation Alexander Kolpakov) and his entourage, who are in turn connected to certain heads of the central office of the FSB and the former head of the Presidential Property Management Department Kolpakov, were and are actively involved in resolving issues of large entrepreneurs with the withdrawal of especially large sums of money abroad to offshore accounts, including the Seychelles, and the money of large agricultural corporations, trading companies, real estate rental companies, fuel trade, and regional energy supply companies is being withdrawn.</p> <p>In this area of ​​criminal business, Cherkesov and Valiev have long since earned decent money.</p> <p>It is precisely with the capabilities of Valiev and his friends in the FSB that Chaika&#39;s attention to Valiev is associated, given his connections in law enforcement circles and among the leaders of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic and especially Ingushetia, where the Chaika family has very big plans to monopolize the garbage business, and in general to withdraw part of the business to the North Caucasus from under the &quot;dangerous&quot; Moscow jurisdiction, where not all of the family are friends.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>It is precisely with this that Chaika and several other big figures from his circle are actively lobbying for the appointment of Mikhail Gutseriev to the post of Head of the Republic of Ingushetia. The price of the appointment may be &quot;services&quot; for redirecting business flows and &quot;protection&quot; of the family business, in areas controlled by the Chaikas.</p> <p>The appointment of the son of the Plenipotentiary Representative Igor Chaika to the Rossotrudnichestvo organization is connected precisely with the fears of the Plenipotentiary Representative that under certain conditions he himself will be removed from office and certain people will convince the President of the Russian Federation to check the Chaika family affairs. For example, where did about 7 billion of budget money go, allocated from a special budget fund created to support Russian companies directly doing business with foreign companies. Allocated to one of the companies of Chaika&#39;s son - to establish direct deliveries of allegedly ice cream and beer to China. The subsidy was simply &quot;mastered&quot; with kickbacks to &quot;responsible&quot; persons from the Government of the Russian Federation, in other words, stolen, since no business happened. And this was a condition for receiving it.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Being in Rossotrudnichestvo, it will, of course, be much easier and cheaper for Igor Chaika, hiding behind state interests, to withdraw the accumulated funds to foreign accounts, since Rossotrudnichestvo is actively involved in organizing and implementing anti-sanction measures, including &quot;gray&quot; schemes for transferring money abroad and back. And this is no secret for business.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Chaika&#39;s son &quot;sat down&quot; competitively on a very &quot;sweet&quot; topic in terms of corruption.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>It is for this reason that the Republic of Ingushetia and the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic are very convenient for wire transfers under the supervision of Rossotrudnichestvo for money transfers from the Russian Federation, and Islamic banks work very well in the regions of the North Caucasus. The Valiyevs are very much needed for the purposes of running around on similar cases in the republics. The Plenipotentiary Representative himself should not do this, supervise - he is in the federal civil service. There is a son and &quot;loyal&quot; guys.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>VChK-OGPU and Rucriminal.info have established that A.A. Valiev received and receives funds for direct participation and cover-up of criminal schemes for withdrawing money into criminal circulation, abroad, for money personally invested in this business in firms:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>OOO &quot;GLOBALCONSULT&quot;.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>&quot;GLOBALCONSULT&quot; 119034, Moscow, Prechistenskaya embankment, 15/1, building 5, fl./off. 3/10, INN 7723497130.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>OOO &quot;MEP&quot;.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>&quot;MAKRO ADVISORY PARTNERS&quot;, INN 7704456353.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>119034, Moscow, Prechistenskaya embankment, 15/1, building 5, fl. 2, off. 1.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The director of the companies is listed as a certain Akhkubekov Akhkubek Khalidbeevich, INN 772831446183.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>OOO &quot;UK POLUS&quot;</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>&quot;MANAGEMENT COMPANY POLUS&quot;, INN 7703405099.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Address: 123056, Moscow, Krasina St., 3, building 1, office 801.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>General Director: Alexey Aleksandrovich Vostokov, INN 246520630508.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>OOO GC &quot;RESULTATCONSULTING&quot;</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>GROUP OF COMPANIES &quot;RESULTATCONSULTING&quot; 115114, Moscow, st. Letnikovskaya, 10, building 4, floor 5, room 1, office 22. INN</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>7707340702.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>General Director Goncharov Yuri Aleksandrovich, INN 77260350212.8</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The registration authority has decided to exclude the legal entity from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities (the presence in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities of information about a legal entity for which an entry has been made about unreliability) from December 18, 2024.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Goncharov Yuri Aleksandrovich founded 5 companies and transferred money through them, which were closed by decision of the Federal Tax Service as left-wing. Valiev Aidamir conducted a joint business with this person, protected him with connections in the FSB for laundering and withdrawing money through various types of contracts. These companies were later &quot;closed down&quot; as criminal &quot;dumps&quot;. In addition to the main apartment, while already working in the Plenipotentiary Representative&#39;s Office, Valiev acquired an additional apartment in Moscow and non-residential premises.</p> <p>Addresses:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>MOSCOW, KRASNOSELSKY, PER. SKORNYAZHNY, 5, BUILDING 1, APT&hellip;.</p> <p>MOSCOW, PR-KT. LENINGRADSKY, 29, BUILDING 3, POM. &hellip;</p> <p>Has three expensive foreign-made cars, additional real estate and cars, and bank accounts. Everything is in the classic style of a corrupt civil servant.</p> <p>Arseny Dronov</p> <p>To be continued</p> How a humble clerk feeds the generals https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-skromnyy-klerk-generalov-kormit https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-skromnyy-klerk-generalov-kormit Aide to the Plenipotentiary Representative Valiyev: from FSB Deputy Director Sedov to the former head of the Presidential Property Management Department Koplakov Sun, 23 Mar 2025 19:00:00 +0000 article <p>After a series of publications by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel and Rucriminal.info about the assistant to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus Federal District Yuri Chaika and at the same time his trusted person in the sphere of business and personnel - Aidamir Valiyev - he became very agitated.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/avaliev/3/%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.png" style="height:297px; width:450px" /></p> <p>According to sources, the reason for this was that the Plenipotentiary Representative Chaika received a call from FSB Deputy Director Alexei Sedov, possibly on the instructions of the Director of the FSB of the Russian Federation. In essence, Chaika was asked to quickly sort out the problematic information and take measures to prevent further similar publications. Oddly enough, there were no offers to sort out the personality of Valiyev himself and his actions and who he ultimately works for - for the criminal structures of the family of Yuri Chaika or is he still a federal civil servant.</p> <p>After the conversation with Deputy Director Sedov, the Plenipotentiary Representative held a meeting at which he conveyed to all those present and not present that they would investigate where the information was leaking from, find and deal harshly with those who facilitated its dissemination.</p> <p>At the same time, Chaika portrayed Valiyev as some kind of victim of intrigue. This is understandable, as an &quot;old guard&quot; Chaika &quot;does not abandon his own.&quot;</p> <p>No checks were conducted on Valiyev&#39;s activities. And it is not surprising. VChK-OGPU sources indicate that it was on the instructions of General Sedov that the existing incriminating evidence on Valiyev was &quot;erased&quot; in inquiries, when appointing him to the position in the Plenipotentiary Representative&#39;s Office, including dismissal due to lack of confidence and other materials that would have been sufficient to prevent him from getting any positions in various federal services.</p> <p>Let us recall that the falsifications in Valiev&#39;s declarations were covered up for 2 years on the orders of Yuri Chaika by the head of the department supervising the personnel work of the plenipotentiary representative - Maksim Zinchenko - a &quot;professional&quot; in mass approvals of state awards and personnel appointments for a &quot;bonus&quot; to natives of the Caucasian republics without checking their merits and achievements. Another would have been fired, but Valiev was &quot;clearly&quot; mistaken, several times either not indicating income in companies where he had shares, or forgetting about real estate, or something else.</p> <p>The VChK-OGPU will help to objectively sort out this situation.</p> <p>According to sources, deputy director Sedov is an old comrade from their joint service in one department - the Federal Drug Control Service - with the chairman of the Public Chamber of the Republic of Dagestan Azizbek Cherkesov. The Cherkesov family has been friends with the Valiev family for a long time, and Azizbek Cherkesov&rsquo;s son, Rashidbek Azizbekovich Cherkesov, is a long-time friend and close business partner of Aidvamir Valiev. Their common main company is OOO SGT-CAPITAL, INN: 7705555854, Legal address: Legal address: 121099, Moscow, Novinsky Boulevard, 11A, building 1, where the general director is listed as Rashidbek Azizbekovich Cherkesov, who is also the founder, and the second founder of the company is Aidamir Aleksandrovich Valiev himself, who, after repeated falsification of declarations of a civil servant, was forced to register his share of 20 percent to a fictitious person, a certain Anna Nikolaevna Ivanova, INN 690600200608, and continues to receive dividends from the company&#39;s activities, only formally not participating in its activities.</p> <p>This business has its own interesting history. According to sources of Rucriminal.info, in 2011, in the city of Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Krai, LLC &ldquo;SPK&rdquo; ​​&ldquo;Limited Liability Company &ldquo;Construction and Production Company&rdquo; was registered, INN: 2632098611, Legal address: 357500, Stavropol Krai, Pyatigorsk, st. Ermolova, 30, the general director of which was at one time a certain former Individual Entrepreneur - IP Grebennikov Gennady Anatolyevich, INN 440400068761, registered in the city of Lermontov, Stavropol Territory, then the company was headed by a certain Kireev Igor Nikolaevich INN 712804604918.</p> <p>It immediately draws attention to the fact that the founder of this company is an interesting organization: &quot;LIKOR CORPORATION&quot;, Country SEYCHELLES, registration number 174868. Name of the registering organization: DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SEYCHELLES ISLANDS REGISTRAR OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COMPANIES.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>In the Russian Federation, this offshore company created more than 50 companies (Moscow, Samara, Ulyanovsk) and liquidated them after laundering funds received from various contracts.</p> <p>It would seem that this is a small company in the city of Pyatigorsk in the Stavropol Territory and the Seychelles. However, not everything is so simple. According to sources close to the SVR, it is indicated that the company &quot;LIKOR CORPORATION&quot; in the offshore is one of the &quot;dumps&quot; created to transfer funds abroad and the dark machinations of the former Administrative Department of the President of the Russian Federation, Kolpakov Alexander Sergeevich.</p> <p>Established in 2011 in Pyatigorsk, LLC &quot;SPK&quot; &quot;Limited Liability Company &quot;Construction and Production Company&quot;, INN: 2632098611, was a contractor for various Federal State Budgetary Institutions, Federal State Budgetary Institutions and departmental sanatoriums, including the Administrative Department of the President of the Russian Federation. Money stolen from contracts through her and withdrawal were transferred to the offshore by Kolpakov&#39;s people.</p> <p>The schemes for the withdrawal and &quot;rashalov&quot; of these issues were handled by the General Director of the company, Igor Nikolaevich Kireev, INN 712804604918.</p> <p>Later, I.N. Kireev, mentioned above, moved to Moscow and in a few years opened, then liquidated from 55 to 100, and maybe more, companies where he is listed as either the founder or director.</p> <p>Moreover, in some companies where the General Director is I.N. Kireev, the sole founder or General Director is a certain Dag Refik, and what is interesting is that the founder&#39;s INN is not indicated.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>For example:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>OOO &quot;ATLANT&quot;</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>GENERAL DIRECTOR: Dag Refik</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Legal address: 127566, Moscow, st. Rimskogo-Korsakova, 20</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Rent and management of own or leased real estate</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>INN: 7715819023</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Founders:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Dag Refik: 10 thousand rubles (0%)</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>According to sources, Dag Refik is a front man and manager of the schemes for withdrawing part of the funds of the clan of Lieutenant General Kolpakov A.S.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The following company is currently operating in Moscow:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>OOO &quot;RONAPLUS&quot;</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>GENERAL DIRECTOR: Igor Nikolaevich Kireev</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Legal address: 127106, Moscow, Gostinichny proezd, 6, bldg. 2</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Purchase and sale of own real estate</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>INN: 7715554835</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The founder is also listed as that &quot;dark lord&quot; Dag Refik.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The specified company and LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY &quot;SGT-CAPITAL&quot;, INN: 7705555854, Legal address: Legal address: 121099, Moscow, Novinsky Boulevard, 11A, bldg. 1, where Rashidbek Cherkesov is listed as the general director Azizbekovich, who is also the founder, and the second founder of the company - Valiev Aidamir Aleksandrovich, actively interact in commercial activities.</p> <p>To be continued</p> <p>Timofey Grishin</p> How FSB General Tkachev jailed General Muryshov https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-general-fsb-tkachev-sajal-generala-muryshova https://rucriminal.info/en/material/kak-general-fsb-tkachev-sajal-generala-muryshova “At least 10 people entered the apartment, the rest remained on the landing in the entrance” Sat, 22 Mar 2025 20:32:50 +0000 article <p>The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel continues to acquaint readers with the speech at the trial of the former head of the anti-corruption department of the Federal Customs Service of Russia Dmitry Muryshov, whose case (he is accused of receiving bribes) is currently being heard in the 235th garrison military court. As we reported earlier, Muryshov turned out to be not a &ldquo;colonel&rdquo; of the customs service, as was previously announced, but a major general of the FSB of the Russian Federation, seconded to the Federal Customs Service. The general became a &ldquo;bargaining chip&rdquo; in the game to remove his good friend from the FSB, the then head of the Federal Customs Service Vladimir Bulavin.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/fts/1/%D0%A4%D0%A2%D0%A1%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E%20%282%29.jpg" style="height:614px; width:450px" /></p> <p>Among other things, he is accused of receiving bribes&hellip;.antique, collectible plates. These plates were a gift for the then head of the Main Directorate of the &quot;Center for Monitoring and Operational Control of the Federal Customs Service of Russia&quot; Philip Zolotnitsky. He is a long-time hero of our channel. And not only because of his participation in corruption schemes, but also as the husband of the press secretary of the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Irina Volk. Zolotnitsky has always been an untouchable figure in the Federal Customs Service due to his closeness (according to some sources, they are relatives) to the former head of the Federal Customs Service Andrei Belyaninov (who is close to Putin).</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The plates in honor of the Franco-Russian Union of 1891 were given to Muryshov by the former employee of the Federal Customs Service Okorokov, previously convicted of fraud. Upon his release, Okorokov became one of the biggest fixers at the Federal Customs Service, knew absolutely all the generals of the department (he was very close and friends with the same Zolotnitsky). He also collected money from businessmen under the pretext of transferring it to the generals of the Federal Customs Service. And at the same time, he was an agent of the K Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. When Tkachev decided to &quot;take down&quot; Muryshov-Bulavin, Okorokov immediately testified that he received money from businessmen for Muryshov. And businessmen Shabaev and Makovkin on the same day wrote a statement and confession in the name of Tkachev that they gave bribes to Okorokov specifically for Muryshov. However, Shabaev and Makovkin themselves never saw Muryshov and could not even name his position in court.</p> <p>Rucriminal.info publishes the second part of Muryshov&#39;s speech:</p> <p>&quot;About Shabaev D.Yu. and Makovkin A.A.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I knew nothing about Shabaev D.Yu. and Makovkin A.A., as well as about the legal entities in which they carried out their work activities, until the court hearing to extend the term of my detention on 01.03.2024. It was then that I first learned that in January 2024 they had filed confession statements in which they admitted guilt in allegedly giving me a bribe.</p> <p>It is noteworthy that the said statements signed by Shabaev D.Yu. and Makovkin A.A., who, as established in court, do not know each other, were addressed to the same person - the head of the &quot;K&quot; Department of the FSB of Russia&#39;s Economic Security Service Tkachev I.I., and were submitted to the FSB of Russia only in January 2024, despite the fact that both Shabaev D.Yu. and Makovkin A.A. were aware of the &quot;criminality of their actions&quot; back in the fall of 2022.</p> <p>I know that the procedure for accepting a crime report and conducting an investigation into it in the FSB of Russia is regulated by a special Instruction. According to this instruction, the duty officer receives the initial information, then the Affairs Directorate determines the unit whose competence includes conducting an investigation into the report. All this takes several days. From the testimonies of Shabaev D.Yu. and Makovkin A.A. it follows that their statements and explanations were accepted on the same day. Due to the specifics of the work of the FSB of Russia, this could only happen in one case - if it was prepared and planned in advance by the FSB of Russia employees. In addition, the statements themselves were written in a similar language, using expressions that were not typical for their signatories, which was confirmed by specialist Markovich V.A. in court.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>All of the above indicates illegal actions by the employees of the &quot;K&quot; Department of the SEB of the FSB of Russia, aimed at artificially creating and obtaining evidence of my involvement in some crimes.</p> <p>If they did transfer funds under the circumstances that they themselves stated in the court hearing, then these funds were clearly not intended for me, but for Okorokov I.V. or third parties in whose interests he acted. Considering everything that I have already said about him (in particular, that he had already been convicted), this really seems to be true. This means that there are grounds to see signs of fraud in his actions.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The fact that law enforcement agencies do not see signs of this crime in his actions does not indicate their absence, but rather that Okorokov I.V. acted under pressure from employees of the Department &quot;K&quot; of the FSB of Russia (whose goal was to remove me from office by initiating illegal criminal prosecution against me). Thus, Okorokov I.V. acted as a provocateur under the threat of bringing himself and/or his wife to criminal responsibility.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Neither Shabaev D.Yu. nor Makovkin A.A. reported in their testimony that they had any contacts with me, not to mention the fact that neither of them could name in court where is the name of my position.</p> <p>In addition, the testimony of Shabaev D.Yu. and Makovkin A.A. that the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federal Customs Service of Russia could and did influence the conduct of any verification activities in relation to commercial organizations was not only not verified in any way during the preliminary investigation of the case, but is also absurd, since:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>1. Officials of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federal Customs Service of Russia do not have such powers.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>2. Verification activities in relation to businessmen are carried out by other divisions of the Federal Customs Service of Russia - the Main Department of Customs Control, the Main Directorate of Customs Control after the release of goods, etc.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>3. The decision on conducting verification activities during customs clearance (inspection, examination, adjustment of the cost of goods) is carried out in most cases automatically on the basis of the risk management system (RMS) and its main element - the risk profile: it determines the measures to minimize risks and the need to conduct verification activities.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Meanwhile, there is no information in the criminal case materials about any verification activities carried out in relation to Ostashkov Export LLC and Pyat Planet LLC within the framework of customs control. At the same time, this data is easily established in the conditions of the existing level of digitalization in customs authorities, which was not done by the investigation.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>ABOUT THE SEARCH 08-09.12.2022</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>On the night of 08.12.2022 to 09.12.2022, at about 1 a.m., the front door of my service apartment at the address: Moscow, Leninsky Prospekt, 131, apt. 540, rang. My wife, M.V. Muryshova, and I woke up, after which I went to the door to find out who had come. Looking through the peephole, I saw a landing filled with people, among whom were my colleagues from the FSB of Russia.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>After that, I returned to the bedroom, got dressed and went to open the front door of the apartment. There were about 15 people on the landing, among whom I knew the employees of the 7th department of the &quot;K&quot; department of the SEB FSB of Russia (Voronin Alexey Nikolaevich, Bazhenov Roman Antonovich, Marachevsky Denis Mikhailovich, Korolev Viktor Viktorovich), as well as three officers of the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB of Russia, one of whom I personally know - Yaroslav Starshinov.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>At least 10 people entered the apartment, the rest remained on the landing in the entrance. One of those present, without introducing himself, demanded that I hand over the mobile phones belonging to me and my wife, which we did, voluntarily providing the passwords. After that, some documents were quickly read to me, and the FSB officer Yaroslav Starshinov suggested that I put on my outerwear, since I needed to go with them. I returned to the bedroom, changed my clothes, took my passport, FSB ID and VTB Bank salary card out of my briefcase. At that moment, I told my wife that there was no need to worry, since my colleagues from the FSB were among the guests. After that, I went to the cloakroom for a jacket, and at that moment I was asked to hand over my salary card. Having dressed, I left the apartment together with several FSB officers. I would like to note that all this time I observed the chaotic movement of those present around the apartment and the landing, and the front door remained open.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I remember that I was taken away by three FSB Internal Security officers (Yaroslav Starshinov and two of his colleagues), as well as an employee of the 7th department of the &quot;K&quot; department of the FSB Economic Security Service, D.M. Marachevsky. Together with the Internal Security officers, we got into a minivan parked near the house, and D.M. Marachevsky got into another car. The remaining guests remained in the apartment. And only in the car I learned from the dialogue between Yaroslav and the driver that we were going to the Investigative Committee of Russia on Tekhnichesky Lane.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I will note that I did not read any resolution on the search of the home that night. I learned that everything that happened in my service apartment was a search after it was conducted.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>During my interrogation on 12/15/2022 by investigator Averyanov D.Yu. I learned that on 12/09/2022, during a search in a black leather jacket allegedly belonging to me, hanging on a hanger in the hallway, 57 bills of 100 US dollars each were found.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>In this regard, I would like to state that all my outerwear is stored in the dressing room, and the only thing that could hang on the hanger in the hallway was my sports uniform (a warm jacket and bright blue pants), which can in no way be called a black leather jacket.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The specified funds (57 bills of 100 US dollars each) do not belong to me, their origin is unknown to me. I am sure that their so-called discovery is an unfair staging by employees of the 7th Department of the Directorate &quot;K&quot; of the FSB of Russia.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>ABOUT MEDICINES</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>In addition to other health problems, I suffer from an allergic disease. As part of the treatment, I am forced to constantly take medications. In 2022, I was treated at the &quot;Institute of Immunology&quot; of the Federal Medical and Biological Agency of Russia, where I twice received prescriptions from my attending physician, Evgenia Valerievna Nazarova, for the use of medications.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>One of the effective drugs recommended to me for use is the drug &quot;Oraltek&quot;. In 2022 it was not sold in Russia, and I asked for help with it. purchase to my friends. Several people responded to my request.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I received the first few packages in July 2022 from my colleague from the Federal Customs Service of Russia, Vladimir Viktorovich Chevychalov. After that, at the end of July 2022, I received several more bottles of this medicine from my friend Vladimir Vitalyevich Spiridonov.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>As a result, I had an excess of this medicine. Since the course of treatment was a year (4 packages of 2 bottles) and given the limited shelf life of Oraltek, my wife and I decided to sell the surplus, which I informed my doctor about. We sent the drug to those in need, and at the end of August 2022 we managed to sell one package of this medicine for 300 euros.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Okorokov I.V. also responded to my request and helped me with the purchase and delivery of this product to Russia. In October 2022, he informed me that the medicine had been delivered and was in his office. Okorokov I.V. handed it over to his employee, who on 10/18/2022 handed over this medicine to my driver Sigachev S.N., which he reliably reported in court. I asked Sigachev S.N. to leave the medicine in the car, since I planned to take it home in the evening, and the temperature conditions in the car parked on the street were suitable for storing this medicine. At the end of the working day on 10/18/2022, Sigachev S.N., as usual, drove me home, and I took these medicines.</p> <p>ABOUT PLATES</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>In October 2022, my colleague at the Federal Customs Service of Russia Zolotnitsky F.A. invited me and my wife to dinner in honor of his birthday. I asked Okorokov I.V. for help in choosing a gift, since, as far as I knew, they had known each other for a long time and he knew about the preferences. We settled on a set of decorative plates on the theme of the formation of the military alliance between Russia and France. We also discussed the choice of this gift with Okorokov I.V. and my wife Muryshova M.V. in a messenger.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>On October 19, 2022, Okorokov I.V. gave me these plates in a black bag, and on the same day I brought them home and asked my wife to pack them beautifully. Three plates were related to the theme of the formation of the military alliance between Russia and France, and the fourth plate was different in style, so my wife and I decided not to give it. On October 20, 2022, my wife and I met with Zolotnitsky F.A. and his wife at the Bouillabaisse restaurant and presented our gift.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>On November 1, 2022, I met with Okorokov I.V. in the cafe &quot;Pirogi, Vino i Gus&quot;, where Okorokov I.V. gave me a set of plates with a Christmas theme as a gift, including one related to the birth of children. The plates were packed in protective film and given to me in a black bag with golden diagonal stripes. In the cafe, I took out one of the plates, looked at it, and then put it back. That same evening, I brought them home. In conclusion, I would like to note again that I have never received any money as bribes. This criminal case is the result of a provocation, the purpose of which was to remove me from my position by compromising me. For this purpose, persons who knowingly gave false testimony were involved in the provocation (in particular, Kolganov K.E., Okorokov I.V., Shabaev D.Yu., Makovkin A.A.). Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence of my receipt of bribes and, accordingly, attempts to detain me red-handed, the discovery of 5,700 US dollars that obviously did not belong to me was staged during an illegally conducted search.</p> <p>Finally, Marachevsky D.M. and Kolganov K.E., who took direct part in this provocation, currently hold senior positions in the Federal Customs Service of Russia (the head of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federal Customs Service of Russia and the head of the anti-corruption department of the Domodedovo Customs Office, respectively).&rdquo;</p> <p>Timofey Grishin</p> &quot;I am a major general of the FSB of the Russian Federation&quot; https://rucriminal.info/en/material/ya-yavlyayus-general-mayorom-fsb-rf https://rucriminal.info/en/material/ya-yavlyayus-general-mayorom-fsb-rf A secret security officer at the customs service is being tried for bribes through a mailbox Fri, 21 Mar 2025 20:17:01 +0000 article <p>The VChK-OGPU telegram channel has obtained a speech at the trial of the former head of the anti-corruption department of the FCS of Russia Dmitry Muryshov, whose case (he is accused of receiving bribes) is currently being heard in the 235th garrison military court. As we reported earlier, Muryshov turned out to be not a &quot;colonel&quot; of the customs service, as was previously announced, but a major general of the FSB of the Russian Federation seconded to the FCS. The general became a &quot;bargaining chip&quot; in the game to remove his good friend from the FSB, the then head of the FCS Vladimir Bulavin. This game was led by the head of the K Department of the FSB of the Russian Federation Ivan Tkachev. Everything was staged in the best &quot;cannibalistic&quot; traditions of Lubyanka. In this post we present the first part of Muryshov&#39;s speech, where he talks about his arrest. Everything was staged in the style of the film &quot;Burnt by the Sun&quot;. To prevent the general from doing anything stupid, the five FSB officers who came to him at night were his good acquaintances, and some were friends with whom they celebrated the holidays. They did not issue search warrants, etc., but simply took him away. And then, according to Muryshov, they planted the main evidence on him - they put a dollar kidney in his jacket pocket in the hallway.</p> <p><img alt="" src="https://rucriminal.info/files/fts/1/%D0%A4%D0%A2%D0%A1%20%D0%B2%20%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8E.jpg" style="height:351px; width:450px" /></p> <p>Rucriminal.info will publish Muryshov&#39;s speech in several parts:</p> <p>&quot;To begin with, I would like to note that the analysis of the evidence presented by the state prosecutor at the court hearing still does not allow me to understand what I am accused of and what exactly I need to defend myself against.</p> <p>The essence of the charges brought against me is still unclear to me. It is unclear what actions I am personally accused of, what actions of mine the prosecution considers illegal. The time, place and methods of their commission are unknown. It is also unclear on what basis the prosecution concludes that I had the intent to commit a crime and the corresponding mercenary motive.</p> <p>I would like to state that with such an accusation, I am effectively deprived of the opportunity to defend myself, because I do not know what exactly I need to explain to the unformulated accusation against me. I do not admit my guilt in committing the crimes provided for in Part 6 of Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>About my service and job responsibilities</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>According to the certificate issued on 09.12.2022 by the Deputy Head of the Personnel Department of Military Unit No. 93967, Colonel Nesov S.V., I am a major general and am serving under a contract in the said military unit. The contract for military service was concluded until 23.09.2026.</p> <p>My status and rank as a military serviceman are also confirmed by my service ID, which shows that I am a major general of the FSB of the Russian Federation. My service in the customs authorities along with my military service was due to the goals of fulfilling my official duties as an employee of the FSB of the Russian Federation. It was for these purposes that I began serving in the customs authorities in November 2018. First, as an adviser to the head of the FCS of Russia, and from 03.06.2019, as the head of the Anti-Corruption Department of the FCS of Russia. In accordance with the job description of the Head of the Anti-Corruption Department of the Federal Customs Service of Russia dated July 20, 2020, contrary to the position of the prosecution, my competence did not include specific supervisory, control, organizational and administrative or other functions of a government representative, by virtue of which I could provide any &quot;assistance to participants in foreign economic activity in the movement of goods across the customs border&quot;, expressed, among other things, in evading operational-search measures to verify their financial and economic activities.</p> <p>One of the areas of my activity was working with operational information on signs of possible offenses in the activities of customs authorities ....</p> <p>About my interaction with Okorokov I.V.</p> <p>The successful fulfillment of my official tasks certainly implied the need to obtain relevant operational information. The sources of such information are varied. One of such sources are persons involved in customs activities in one way or another. One of such persons was Okorokov I.V.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Okorokov I.V.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I met I.V. Okorokov at the end of 2018, that is, in the first months of my service in the FCS of Russia. We were introduced by a mutual friend, my colleague Nikolai Vladimirovich Sintsov, who introduced I.V. Okorokov to me as a former employee of the FCS of Russia. Communication with I.V. Okorokov was important for me, since he was a source of operational information and regularly provided me with information of interest to me as an advisor to the head of the Anti-Corruption Department (UCD) of the FCS of Russia and subsequently as the head of the UPC of the FCS of Russia. In turn, I.V. Okorokov, carrying out entrepreneurial activities, including those related to customs procedures, expressed concern about the possible unjustified and illegal interference in his activities by customs officers, which, among other things, could may be initiated by competitors.</p> <p>In response to this, I always suggested that Okorokov I.V. continue to carry out his activities, and in the event of signs of illegal behavior on the part of customs officials, inform me officially or unofficially.</p> <p>Thus, Okorokov I.V. was the bearer of information of professional interest to me (operationally significant information). At the same time, I understood that Okorokov I.V., having been convicted of fraud, had already demonstrated his inclination to commit illegal acts by deception, and the information received from him required careful verification.</p> <p>I also realized that in communicating with me, Okorokov I.V. could pursue his own interests, including selfish ones. Therefore, I always maintained the necessary distance from him, preventing the use of this communication for committing illegal actions.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>For this reason, while motivating him to provide me with information, I, nevertheless, never gave him promises to assist him or his counterparties in achieving their goals aimed at making a profit from entrepreneurial activity related to customs clearance of goods transported across the border by any illegal means.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Assistance and testimony of Okorokov I.V.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The assistance that could be discussed in any matter concerned exclusively the verification of information on possible illegal behavior of customs officials or assistance in obtaining professional advice on current customs tariffs and rules regarding a particular product, especially in the context of the application of new sanctions.</p> <p>As for the testimony of Okorokov I.V., I declare that in terms of my involvement in receiving bribes, they are deliberately false, which I reported in the statement of crime filed with the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Considering that Okorokov I.V. previously convicted of fraud, I can assume that in a similar situation, not wanting to be brought to criminal responsibility again, he agreed with the proposal of the operatives working on the version of my involvement in the crimes incriminated to me, to slander me. In this regard, in my opinion, his testimony cannot be perceived as absolutely reliable, especially in the absence of other confirmation, in particular, evidence of the transfer of funds to me. Moreover, during a personal conversation in one of the court hearings on extending the term of detention for me and Okorokov I.V., he admitted to me that he slandered me specifically in order to protect his wife from certain problems that she might otherwise have with law enforcement agencies. I note that when my defense attorney asked me about this in the court hearing on this criminal case, Okorokov I.V. did not answer, citing Article 51 of the Constitution. Such a refusal to answer is much more eloquent than the answer itself - after all, Article 51 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not give a witness the right to refuse to answer any question. Art. 51 of the Constitution allows not to answer only those questions, the answers to which are directed against the witness himself or his spouse and close relatives. Thus, Okorokov I.V. confirmed that he really had grounds for slandering me.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>About Kolganov K.E.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>The second person who gave knowingly false testimony against me, slandering me, is Kolganov K.E. I also reported this in the statement of the crime filed with the Chairman of the Investigative Committee of Russia.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I was introduced to Kolganov K.E. by Okorokov I.V. at the beginning of 2020. Okorokov I.V. recommended that I take a closer look at Kolganov K.E. as a candidate for the position in the Anti-Corruption Department (CPC) of the Federal Customs Service (FCS) of Russia, giving him a positive characterization. In this regard, after agreement with the head of the Federal Customs Service of Russia and the head of the 7th department of the Directorate &quot;K&quot; of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia, the procedure for registering K.E. Kolganov as the head of the Anti-Corruption Service of the Central Base Customs of the Federal Customs Service of Russia was launched.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>From April 2020 to April 2022, K.E. Kolganov held the specified position, that is, he was not directly subordinate to me, since the activities of the Anti-Corruption Service of the Central Base Customs of the Federal Customs Service of Russia were actually supervised by my deputy (for operational issues) and directly by the head of the Central Base Customs of the Federal Customs Service of Russia. I would like to clarify that K.E. Kolganov, being an employee of this service, as well as the employees of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Federal Customs Service of Russia, did not have the authority to assist participants in foreign economic activity and in the movement of goods across the customs border.</p> <p>I consider it necessary to note that K.E. Kolganov has a personal interest in my slander. This interest is explained by the following:</p> <p>In May 2022, Kolganov K.E. was dismissed from the bodies of the Federal Customs Service of Russia on my initiative due to the revealed fact of corrupt actions related to abuse of office. Mnit became known that law enforcement agencies became interested, having information that he allegedly demanded money from an individual for the allegedly rendered service of returning expensive watches seized at the Sheremetyevo customs office when crossing the customs border. The materials of the investigation into the fact of extortion of money by Kolganov K.E. were being processed by:</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>&bull; Moscow Investigative Department for Air and Water Transport of the Western Interdistrict Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia,</p> <p>&bull; Investigative Department for the city of Khimki of the Main Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of Russia for the Moscow Region,</p> <p>&bull; Nikulinsky Mobile District Investigative Department of the Investigative Department of the Russian Federation for the Western Administrative District of the city of Moscow.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Taking into account the information about the investigation being carried out against Kolganov K.E. During the inspection, I suggested that he resign of his own accord before the information about the inspection results became public, and independently defend his interests without casting a shadow on the department called upon to combat corruption among customs officers.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>As far as I know, in May 2022, Kolganov K.E. turned himself in to one of the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation on this fact. However, I do not know whether Kolganov K.E. was brought to criminal responsibility or not.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>Subsequently, I learned that Kolganov K.E. intends to be reinstated in the customs service. My position was that this is possible only if a decision is made to refuse to initiate a criminal case.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>From this, I assume that Kolganov K.E., wanting to avoid possible liability for the illegal actions he himself committed, decided to provide law enforcement agencies with distorted or fictitious information, including me in the scheme of his relations with persons unknown to me. In doing so, he tried to avoid responsibility for the offense he had committed by inventing and introducing a non-existent role of the organizer of the incriminated crimes onto me.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>For these purposes, in my opinion, he could well have acted as an agent provocateur with the aim of artificially creating evidence of my involvement in crimes that did not actually take place, and by compromising me - removing me from my position.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I believe that Kolganov K.E. was forced to cooperate with the special services in such a way in order to avoid responsibility for his own illegal activities. According to Kolganov K.E., he addressed the statement allegedly printed by an FSB officer in the car to the security agencies.</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I would like to draw attention to the fact that a person who was actually convicted of committing crimes twice, nevertheless, again turned out to be an employee of the FCS of Russia (as Kolganov K.E. explained in court, he currently holds the position of head of the anti-corruption department of the Domodedovo customs office). I believe that his re-employment is the &quot;30 pieces of silver&quot; that he received by slandering me.</p> <p>In my opinion, the circumstances of how Kolganov K.E. and Nesterenko D.B. were drawn into this scheme convincingly testify to the far-fetched nature and the creation of the appearance of evidence of my illegal and non-existent activities.</p> <p>The authorship attributed to me in developing the scheme for transferring funds through Kolganov K.E.&#39;s mailbox at the address: Moscow, Novy Arbat St., Building 16, does not take into account the fact that I did not know either the address of this apartment of Kolganov K.E., or even the location of this mailbox.</p> <p>I have not communicated with Kolganov K.E. since his dismissal from the post of head of the SPK CT of the Federal Customs Service of Russia, that is, since May 2022. After his dismissal from the customs authorities under the above circumstances, Kolganov K.E. became for me a person who tarnished the honor of an officer.</p> <p>I will also add that in the testimony of K.E. Kolganov there is no information confirming his knowledge of when, where, how and in what amount the funds were transferred to me.</p> <p>About D.B. Nesterenko</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> <p>I first saw D.B. Nesterenko at the first court hearing on extending my detention, which took place on 06.02.2023, I learned about him for the first time from the decision to initiate a criminal case dated 08.12.2022. Before that, I was not familiar with D.B. Nesterenko, I know nothing about his work activity. &quot;</p> <p>Timofey Grishin</p> <p>To be continued</p>